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 1 
Rushing to Reginn: The evolution of a semi-
institutional approach 
Introduction 
Background 
The past decade has shown a significant change in the way economic development in 
the industrialized world is perceived to take place. The –90’s has been the decade 
where information and knowledge has been brought into the heart of industrial 
change, innovation and economic development. Earlier attention to the role of vari-
ous production factors in a neo-classic economic sense has changed to a focus on the 
very processes by which these factors enter into complex, evolutionary processes. 
The role of research and development, innovation, and competence in the business 
world are seen to become ever more important, linking the knowledge production 
and use with the higher pace of industrial change, product development and innova-
tion in a broad sense.  
 
As larger firms are perceived as not being the engine of employment, small and me-
dium-sized firms have entered the policy arena as the class of firms promising eco-
nomic growth and employment. This also means that the policy attention to SME’s 
and their role and contributions to the economy has changed. SME-related policies 
have to an increasing extent brought in elements of new insights from research, and 
not only in a national context. The single market in Europe, including its recent re-
forms, both opens up new opportunities for business life, as well as representing new 
forms of pressure. As SMEs are a broad and highly inconsistent class of firms, policy 
development that seeks to take their needs into consideration has become an ever dif-
ficult task, leading to a great need for policy learning and exchange of ”best practice” 
across nations.  
 
This has been the general background for the SMEPOL-project, a multi-national re-
search project initiated under the EU’s 4th framework programme. More precisely, 
the project is funded under Targetted Socio-economic Research Programme 
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(TSER)1, and seeks to explore and analyse the characteristica of ”best practice” inno-
vation policy aiming at SMEs. The project ”will evaluate existing programmes and 
policies of promoting innovation activity in different types of SMEs in different sec-
tors and regionas in seven countries in order to identify best practice policy” (Tech-
nical annex to SMEPOL contract). To be more precise, the SMEPOL project seeks to 
assess to what degrees recent policy developments have taken on board recent 
knowledge developments in this area, and to assess the effectiveness and efficiencies 
of the programmes selected, so as to create a wide and thorough basis for policy lear-
ning across nations.  
 
This paper has received valuable comments from Bjørn Terje Asheim, Arne Isaksen 
and Thor-Egil Braadland in the STEP-group.  
 
SMEPOL 
The paper represents one particular study in the Norwegian context. The innovation-
oriented SME policies selected within the SMEPOL, consist of TEFT, a program to 
enhance SME’s use of the R&D infrastructure, NT, a programme to enhance innova-
tion in northern Norway, and RUSH, a programme initiated to improve relations be-
tween state colleges and business life in selected counties in Norway. This paper ex-
plores the RUSH programme and its development into a wider institutional approach 
called REGINN.  
 
All programmes to be studied will be ”benchmarked” according to the same set of  
basic questions. These are derived from some common stock of knowledge on how 
innovation takes place in industrialized economies (further elaborated below). How-
ever, each programme has its own history and set of peculiarities, which means that 
the present paper on RUSH is obviously adapted to this programme. But all in all, 
this study gives attention to the following key issues: 
 
•= External consistency of the programme; 
•= Internal consistency of the programme, in particular the relations between ob-
jectives and means; 
                                                
1 Cofunded with the Norwegian Ministry for Regional Affairs 
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•= Effectiveness of the programme; 
•= Results and impact. 
 
These four dimensions of analysis will help estimate the appropriateness of RUSH as 
well as help provide a comparative basis for the SMEPOL itself.  
 
Innovation theory and policy2 
Innovation policy finds itself increasingly at the centre of policies for en-
hancing economic development in general and SMEs in particular. Inno-
vation is seen as the focal policy area in times of major restructuring of 
the world wide economy, globalisation being the process that gives rise to 
reexaminations of the appropriateness of various policies and instru-
ments. The globalized economy ”leaks”, a fact which represents major 
problems for nation states in their processes of prioritization and policy 
formulation. Innovation policy has received increased attention since it 
aims at improving endogenous capabilities while restricting the propen-
sity of leakage so typical of other forms of economic policy (in particular 
Keynsian ones). 
 
However, innovation itself, or rather how we understand this process, has 
undergone significant changes during the past 10-15 years, a fact that 
lies at the heart of the SMEPOL project. This revised understanding 
gives rise to changing policies, but the understanding, formulated as 
various innovation theories, is not uniform, nor does it represent easy 
transformations to policy.  
 
The new understanding has one key platform, the denial of the linear 
model as the one and only proper model representing innovation proc-
esses in the economy. Rather, innovation should be seen as recursive or 
circular, linking different activities and resources in complex processes to 
                                                
2 From Remøe (1998) 
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generate outcomes that are themselves input to further innovation proc-
esses. Dosi gives the following definition: 
 
 ”In an essential sense, innovation concerns the search for, and the discovery, 
experimentation, development, imitation, and adoption of new products, new 
production processes and new organisational set-ups” (Dosi 1988:22). 
 
Dosi underlines two facets of innovation; uncertainty and cumulative-
ness. The circular or multilink nature of the innovation processes tells us 
that innovation can hardly be planned, but is victim of unpredictability 
and multiple causation. Further, innovation takes place within certain 
modes of asking questions, i.e. of learning, leading to innovation proc-
esses being formed into trajectories of cumulating knowledge. Innovation 
is increasingly seen as a social process, based on interactions between dif-
ferent persons, institutions and firms. Hence, innovation takes place 
within a systemic mode, even within systems of innovation which are es-
sentially institutional set-ups characterstic for given territories. However, 
the systemic orientation towards innovation is not per se territorial, as 
can be derived from one important contribution to the recent understand-
ing of innovation processes, the Maastricht Memorandum, in which the 
systemic model is summarized as follows (Soete and Arundel 1993): 
 
1. multidirectional links at the the same point in time between the 
stages of technical changes; 
2. cumulative processes over time can lead to lock-in and feed-back 
effects; 
3. technical change is dependent on knowledge and the assimilation 
of information through learning; 
4. the details of the development path and diffusion process for each 
innovation are unique; 
5. technical change is an interdependent and systemic process.  
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Any territorial implication is not explicit, but may be linked to all the 
above points via the concept of  ”proximity”. A key question in this paper, 
is therefore whether the systemic or evolutionary approach to innovation 
implies a proximity variable. Or in other words, whether ”proper” innova-
tion policy towards SMEs needs to rest on some notion of a regional sys-
tem in which proximity facilitates interaction and learning vital for inno-
vation outcomes. Before returning to this issue, a further examination of 
the important changes that have taken place during the last couple of 
decades may cast further light on the issue. Lundvall and Barras refer to 
these changes in identifying four trends: 
 
a) Acceleration: The rate of technical change has sped up dramati-
cally. Product life cycles are significantly shorter. 
b) Interfirm collaboration and industrial networks: Sources of innova-
tion are multiple, making firms more dependant on inputs which 
they cannot master inhouse.  
c) Functional integration and networking inside firms: This refers to 
a lesser degree of compartmentalization and intrafirm networking 
within essentially medium sized and larger firms.  
d) Collaboration with knowledge production centres: The advance-
ment of science becomes ever more important to the innovation 
process, implying also an increasing degree of specialization in the 
knowledge production, and firms will often have to rely on more 
than one such centre (Lundvall and Barras 1997:24). 
 
Such trends point to the importance of proximity, which has implications 
for a regional systemic outlook on innovation policy. But on the other 
hand, globalization points to the need of linking up to the international 
sources and nodes of knowledge production and learning. In the global 
village, proximity may be achieved ”virtually” through contractual rela-
tions between partners in some common system of complementary inter-
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ests. Even SMEs may need to transcend their regional setting and link up 
internationally through developing new relations or surfing on old ones.  
 
Even though territorial systems are important, the translation of national 
systems of innovation into regional ones is not free of problems. This op-
eration implies a strenghtening of geographical proximity not necessesar-
ily inherent in the general evolutionary or systemic approach. The insti-
tutional linkages gain another quality, which has been thoroughly dis-
cussed by Storper (1992, 1995), with the wider political-economic context 
as a key variable. Untraded interdependencies have a significant eco-
nomic value, similar to the idea of contractual relations. Regionally ori-
ented innovation policies need to provide an often unrecognized public 
good: that of capacities for collective action. 
 
Policies to support SMEs are often implicitly linked to the regional level, 
suggesting that SME-specific policy is regional policy. This link also exist 
in the rationale for the SMEPOL project. A key component of regional in-
novation policies is the support system or better, the infrastructure aimed 
at providing support and services to the client system. The reference to 
the regional level is usually done without much qualifying criteria. What 
is exactly a region in these terms? And how should a region be understood 
in the contexts of the nation states? It is not clear whether the regional 
level in this case should be understood as the county level, the meso level 
in Norway which is administratively and politically organized to produce 
collective action. And added to this is the question of infrastructure: How 
much infrastructure should be available regionally to support capabilities 
and development, and how much should be restricted to the national 
level? And if the national level to some extent organizes into a regional-
ized system, how should this be assessed relative to the notion of a re-
gional infrastructure linked to the regional level of interactions, policy 
making and interfirm relationships? As we shall show in this paper, these 
questions are not easy to dissolve. However, we need to keep this link at 
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arms’ length, allowing for an understanding of appropriate SME-policy 
buildt on the evolutionary and systemic approach, but without implying 
the regional dimension. It is necessary to distinguish between the quali-
ties of single policies or programs and the need to retain a regional di-
mension in the overall policy framework.  
 
This is, however, also linked to the question of the need to pay sufficient 
attention to the demand side, in this case the needs and ”modus oper-
andi” of the firms themselves. Innovation takes place in the form of conti-
nous improvements, but often limited by the weakness to engage in the 
management of external relations. This weakness leads to a propensity to 
avoid a functional search behaviour to exploit solutions and ideas outside 
the firm. Additionally, the lessons of the past, which has demonstrated 
the need to avoid supply side and technology push programs for this cate-
gory of firms (see e.g. Remøe 1989), lead to the need for a firm specific 
stimulation of searching and learning, and raising the technological ca-
pacity of the firm.  
 
In sum, appropriate innovation policies based on the lessons available in 
the 90’s, need to reflect the demand side, the processes of searching and 
learning, and building capacities for technological development and ex-
ploitation of external sources of technology and knowledge. An additional 
dimension is whether the program in question takes into account the 
building of regional capacities for collective action and infrastructure, or 
whether it rests on other initiatives, through coordination or otherwise, to 
produce the territorial linkages and context in which the SMEs find 
themselves. Last, but not least, the institutional approach of innovation 
systems implies a broad systemic orientation, allowing for programme de-
sign comprising mulitiple system components and the relations between 
them. A limitid focus on one single component would deviate from the 
stock of knowledge developed so far. 
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RUSH and the research design 
RUSH is a program initiated in 1994 and implemented in 1995. The idea is to de-
velop an organizational model that could provide the rgeionally based state colleges 
in Norway with the means to interact with the business community and thus improve 
their institutional role in the innovation system. The objective is two-fold: The pro-
gram aims at stimulating the college staff to enter into contract and development 
work for industry and to strenghten the colleges’ relations to industry. Second, the 
idea is to enhance indirectly the development of the business community and the 
value added production. RUSH represents funding only to the colleges’ efforts to 
change their way of behaviour, projects that are contracted for industry are to be fun-
ded elsewhere.  
 
RUSH is an experimental programme, lasting 4 years, and covering only 4 colleges. 
Thus, the programme was at the outset open-ended, and the REGINN programme, 
initiated in 1997, can be seen as taking over the mandate of RUSH by covering a 
broader institutional and regional approach, specifically aimed at enhancing the insti-
tutional set-up in selected regions and its interrelationships with clusters or milieus of 
industrial firms. This paper, therefore, takes developmental approach, and seeks to 
assess the evolution of RUSH into REGINN as a learning process. 
 
Given this, our main hypthesis is rather straight forward: RUSH was developed on a 
too limited basis, lending attention to a single component in the innovation system. 
This does not mean that RUSH was falsely constructed, only that new information 
for the policy makers gave incentives to improve it. This process, we hypothesise, 
was initiated with particular inputs to the policy learning process. 
 
The research design will center around the four main variables described above. Due 
attention will be given to the policy context of the institutions in question, the state 
colleges, and other regional instruments at that time. Further, the context and policy 
agenda changed, and this gives this paper the challenge of studying policy dyna-
mism: Compared to the study of TEFT (Remøe 1998), more consideration will be 
given to this policy development throughout the programme period.  
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Initiating RUSH 
The context of knowledge based policy3 
The sources of policy formulation for industrial and innovation policy are 
found in the 1970’s. As was the case in most, if not all, industrialized 
countries, the continued growth during the past decades came to a halt in 
the mid-80’s. Although a visible problem was related to the OPEC-
induced oil shock, it soon translated into a wider recognition of the need 
for industrial change. These were not problems of fluctuating business 
cycles, but represented deeper structural problems (Mjøset 1986). Tradi-
tional markets for industrial goods became saturated, and new growth 
was envisaged in new technologies and advanced services. By the end of 
the 70’s most industrialized countries acknowledged the need to invest 
more in reseach and development, and a technology based industrial pol-
icy combined with deregulation and a more delibated market approach 
became the widely accepted medicine (Arbo 1993). 
 
Most countries chose their own route in this period, depending on their 
own economic and political context. The Norwegian approach, based in 
increasing degrees of freedom from the emerging oil revenues, was to en-
force a keynesian demand oriented policy in the period of 1974-78. This 
had particular inflationary results, and the competitive position of Nor-
way deteriorated. The political turnaround came by the end of the decade, 
based on the appearantly reduced effectiveness of keynesian policies in 
small, open economies at that time. A structural policy approach was de-
veloped, giving priority to the competitive sectors of the economy, its 
technological vitalization and increased focus on knowledge based indus-
trial development. By the beginning of the –80’s, a new developmental 
paradigm settled, paving the way for new initiatives in the field of re-
search and technology policy (Arbo 1993:11).  
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The emerging market approach and policies for deregulating economic 
structures implied that the international conditions for policy develop-
ment converged: The continued integration and liberalization between 
states in the global economy led to increased copying or imitation of poli-
cies between them. And the liberal economic context gave neo-classical 
arguments authority in formulating the policies for a more technology 
based economic development. These are basically elements in a market 
failure approach to policy: 
 
•= Appropriation of investments in knowledge and R&D is difficult 
due to externalities, and this leads to incentive problems; 
•= Similarly, failures in the capital markets were seen as crucial, 
causing even profitable projects to lack funding; 
•= High transaction costs in diffusing technologies and innovations 
imply economic losses; 
•= Other countries are increasingly involved in R&D, and this dictates 
to some degree the policy agenda for a small, open economy 
(Streeck 1989, Hervik, Berge and Wicksteed 1992, cited in Arbo 
1993). 
 
Policy areas like industrial policy, regional policy and research policy went through 
significant changes during the –80’s. Like what happended in many countries, in-
creasing trends towards globalisation reduced the effectiveness of keynesian policies, 
or even policies aimed at selective support for key firms and industries. Industrial 
restructuring as a new objective was coupled with the perceived need to enhance 
firms capabilities in ways that did not ”leak out”. The beginning of the 80’s was the-
refore a period of intense policy planning with several white and green papers produ-
ced from the government, and several programmes, a new approach at that time, 
were initiated, often with a certain experimental bias. The trend in the 80’s can be 
summarized in the following points: 
 
                                                                                                                                     
3 This section is based on Remøe (1998) 
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a) Both the industrial, regional and research policies develop a 
sharper profile on technology and competence. This goes together 
with an increasing integration of these and other policy areas. The 
visible number of political instruments increases. The institutional 
set-up for regional policies is enhanced. This change towards an 
endogenously oriented policy, albeit still supply-based, goes to-
gether with a process of similar macro-economic policies in Europe 
and worldwide, giving similar frameworks for firms and govern-
ments to develop their strategies. 
b) The period of selective support was over, and instruments were de-
veloped in a neutral way vis-a-vis the various industrial branches. 
Small and medium-sized firms were seen as an important target 
group, since they were perceived as having problems in capturing 
the knowledge and know-how needed to compete. The support be-
came less rule-based and more based on the assessment of project 
quality. A strategic approach was developed, and from the mid-80’s 
a set of action plans was the main tool to enhance key technology 
areas.  
c) Towards the end of the 80’s, a certain critique of the R&D system 
became visible, pointing to the main technological research insti-
tutes’ position in the wider system. These received a great part of 
the funding for industrial research, while to little drizzled down to 
the receiving end, the SME’s. Evaluations of some of the pro-
grammes in the mid-80’s also underlined the need to develop in-
struments that were based on the real needs and problems of the 
SME’s. Thus, demand-led policies were developed, giving resources 
to the firms and less to the institutes, which implied an increase in 
the relative power of the ”client system” in choosing their partners 
in the R&D system. This demand- or need-oriented policy approach 
was further improved during the 90’s. It is, however, necessary to 
state that the change from a supply to a demand orientation that 
took place around 1990 was a combined effect from evaluations and 
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recruitment of people with an industrial background to the key po-
sitions in policy system.  
d) The increased use of programmes throughout the 80’s implied a 
proactive as well as an experimental approach. The long tradition 
of using social sciences in policy formulation and development gen-
erated a platform for policy learning that proved useful for the con-
tinued development of a demand oriented, and later innovation 
system oriented, policy framework. 
e) The approach to increase the competence and technological capac-
ity was developed at the time when programmes and instruments 
became more directed towards enhancing an infrastructure suit-
able for satisfying the firms’ needs. Networking became the princi-
pal mode already in the late 80’s, an approach that was further de-
veloped and enhanced in the 90’s according to the logic of value 
chains and cluster structures, rather than programme initiated 
project groups.   
f) The notion of demand orientation and infrastructure also led to in-
creasing coordination between the various policy instruments, the 
reason being, among others, that the firms themselves needed a 
clearer framework of policy in which to maneuver. 
 
A point to underline here, is the rather early reorientation of policy. The 
80’s became the learning ground in the post-keynesian era, and the dec-
ade paved the way for a number of initiatives that in their premises, ra-
tionale and orientation were based in an interactive, systems oriented 
mode already around 1990. This happened before the innovation systems 
approach became the new landmark for policy, and the redirection took 
place 3-5 years before most other industrial countries.   
 
The regional focus and the regional research foundations 
A significant piece of work was done by the so-called Thulin comittee (NOU 1991), 
whose green paper laid the foundations for a knowledge and innovation orientation 
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in the industrial policy, implying an integration between this policy area with re-
gional, research and educational policy. The SMEs were given particular attention, 
and it was duely aknowledgeg that the preconditions for R&D were often too scarce. 
The industrial structure, consisting even more of small firms than in most European 
countries, could not provide R&D competence as internal resources in the firms. 
Rather, it became an imperative to organize the structure of R&D competence to fill 
the gap between the major, national institutions and the smaller firms. This gap could 
be filled through exploiting and generating proximity between the supply and the 
demand side. Various solutions were intitated on this background. A system of re-
gional technical-economic competence centres were initiated on an experimental ba-
sis, with temporary support. The work by the Thulin committee, however, also re-
sulted in a wave of interest both from regional (county) authorities as well as from 
the ministry for regional affairs (today called KRD). As one key result, a system of 
regional research foundations were established with support from KRD as well as 
counties and other groups. The main intention was to establish an intermediary sys-
tem of knowledge institutions in the regions which could carry out applied research 
for industrial and public clients. Thus, the system itself changed in the 80-s, leading 
to a more decentralized structure. On the other hand, the universities and colleges 
were virtually left out in this period.  
 
The regional competence centres did not prove to provide the users with much com-
petence, and the concept were to abandoned or in a few cases reorganized into new 
initiatives. The regional research foundations were on the one hand seen as an impor-
tant link in the chain of instruments to support R&D activities in the regions. How-
ever, they were given a relatively poor basic funding, state and regional funding sel-
dom reaching a higher level than 10-15% of the respective institutions’ turnover. 
Thus the research organizations turned to market behaviour which only in rare in-
stances, were the regional or local conditions were present, led to a role as a techni-
cal-industrial centre for the business community. Although these research founda-
tions today can be seen as a success, decentralizing a large share of the R&D activity, 
they were seen as a failure from the point of view of the original intention.  
 
The White Paper on regional policy published in 1993 (St.meld.nr.33), however, 
brings this into a wider framework. Based on an acceptance that knowledge is a key 
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factor for the future industrial development, a tight coherence between the national 
strategies for enhancing competence and the regional politicial efforts. A key objec-
tive for the regional policy is ”to contribute to increased accessability and improved 
exploitation of national instruments”. This is more precisely referred to in the two 
objectives: 
 
”- To secure that inititatives within the national research, educational and de-
velopment policy are accessible for the business in all regions. This means 
that sufficient adaptation to the characteristics of the various counties and re-
gions is taken when the national policy is formulated and implemented. 
- To improve the regional businesses’ opportunities to exploit the total know-
ledge stock available”. 
 
This does not mean that every region should be self sufficient on knowledge based 
services: 
 
”… the information and knowledge flow between actors on the international, 
national, regional and even local arenas is the very condition for industrial re-
newal, also in rural areas. This is a key element behind the implementation of 
”Norgesnettet” (Norwegian Educational Network), which implies that univer-
sities and colleges to a greater degree specializes in areas where they have a 
competitive advantage. The rural and regional policy will support the gov-
ernmental work on developing the Norwegian Educational Network” 
(ibid:60). 
 
The universities and colleges were seen as underexploited as instruments for eco-
nomic development. The early 90’s had brought the university system to the fore-
front of technological and industrial development, and new institutional models were 
seen as necessary to exploit the stock of knowledge that these institutions repre-
sented. New technological areas like bio-technology, information technology etc. 
required new and tighter relationships between the supply and demand side (Gul-
brandsen 1995). The regional focus still present in the policy agenda also made the 
state colleges a target for public innovation policy. Before we enter into details, it is 
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necessary to describe the context of state college policy and reforms that went paral-
lell with the coming of the RUSH-programme. 
 
In sum, it is fair to say that the innovation policy has evolved since the early –80s in 
a problematic way: The early –80s brought a certain regionalization of the R&D sys-
tem, with regional research foundations and competence centres. The late –80s con-
tained a shift towards national programmes. The –90s has led to a further 
regionalization of the college structure (see next section), an integration of the 
regional structure into the national system, and a development of a number of smaller 
national programmes with infrastructural objectives. The general hypothesis coming 
out of this, is that the evolution taking place is not that of a coherent innovation 
system, but that of a fragmented system representing increasing coordination 
problems.  
State colleges: A centralized system being reformed 
The Norwegian system of higher education can be divided in three: four universities, 
nine research colleges, and up until 1994 nearly 200 regional colleges. The overall 
policy in the post war era had 4 objectives (Skoie 1988): 
 
i) Quantitative growth of students, graduates and research; 
ii) Democratization of accessability to higher education; 
iii) Development of a rich and flexible organization for higher education; 
iv) Location of higher education as an instrument within the policy for regional 
development. 
 
Throughout the –60s, -70s and -80s, this led to a formidable growth of the system. A 
key reform took place in the early –70s, when all colleges providing professional 
education where reorganized and upgraded into a system of regional colleges. In the 
–80s, this system had grown into a complex structure of colleges with no clear na-
tional policy guiding it. A Number of studies and White Papers where published in 
the –80s with the aim of helping a reorganization of both the educational and re-
search system. The regional colleges were in 1994 reorganized into 26, with regional 
borads for higher education providing the intermediate mode of governance. 
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This means that the current regional colleges are made up of various schools and stu-
dies with different cultures, histories and profiles (Arbo 1997). They received also a 
mandate to improve the quality of their education, including an increased pressure to 
engage in R&D. This reinforced the earlier conclusion that the regional colleges 
where part of a national system for R&D (St.meld. nr 35, 1975-76). Skoie (1988) re-
fers to this as an ”academic drift”, blurring the distinction between the universities 
and the regional colleges, the latter taking more use of traditional university means of 
organizing R&D, fund research, plan studies etc (Arbo 1997). 
 
The very foundation for these changes where laid down through the so-called Hernes 
committee, responsible for the major green paper in this period, where the very sys-
tem of higher education was reconsidered (NOU 1988: 28). The reorganization was 
to achieve a better use of the societies resources within an overalll national policy 
framework, resulting in the idea of ”Norgesnettet”, or the Norwegian Educational 
Network referred to above. The division of labor envisaged in this network, had two 
aims: First, to give the universities a distinctive role as responsible for basic research 
and graduate education. Second, to develop a clearer role for the regional system, 
which should be responsible for useroriented, applied research in a regional context.  
 
Although such a distinction was made a cornerstone of the reform of 1994, the sys-
tem of meritocracy was aligned, giving the regional system more or less the same 
professional categorization of positions, career prospects, and inherent incentive 
structure. However, one difference was eventually made, making a distinction be-
tween the universities and research colleges on the one hand, and the regional col-
leges on the other: The latter could or should not retain any right for the individual 
academic for R&D activity as part of their position. This was a subject of work plans 
to be approved by the management of the colleges. 
 
This seems like a full decentralization to the benefit of the regional colleges. How-
ever, the ministry retained a high degree of control, in the name of a need for coordi-
nation and to implement a national policy. The degrees of freedom for local college 
management and boards, were far more limited than they appeared to be. 
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One aspect of this can be seen in the legal reform in sector: The great number of 
studies, green and white papers etc culminated in a common act for all universities, 
research colleges and other state colleges, finally implemented in May 1995. The act 
institutionalized the central government’s control over the total sector, in the name of 
national coordination. Although the colleges, and their boards, were given the man-
date to organize the activities (including R&D) in the colleges, the level of centrali-
zation was consistently high. This was clearly demonstrated through ”the guidelines 
for cooperation between universities and research colleges and public and private 
foundations or companies”, issued 26 August 1993. These guidelines were very re-
strictive in nature, posing severe limitations on even traditional patterns of coopera-
tion that existed to that point. Another case was the revision of the memorandum 
about regulations for payments for contracted activities at the universities and col-
leges of 4 March 1996. A particular point was the the rule 2.5, where it was stated 
that clients should normally pay in advance, a rule that the state never applies when 
taking the role as a client. Although these regulations are developed in the ministry’s 
division for universities and colleges, and not in the division for research, they under-
line the restrictive and centralizing nature of the ministry’s governance in this sector. 
 
A key motivation for the ministry behind this development, was to avoid letting the 
private sector getting access to public infrastructure in a way that might imply sub-
sidy. Although this motivation may be reasonable, the way the policy was imple-
mented, it gave the ongoing activities for cooperation with especially the regional 
research foundations a hard blow. The two systems, the state colleges and the re-
search foundations, were seen by many as in great need to develop into a coherent 
system operating on a regional level. Any fruitful development of the relations be-
tween these two in any given region could therefore be termed ”contrary to expecta-
tions.”4 
The period after the reform has two interesting aspects. First, the colleges were man-
dated to increase their level of external funding, e.g. from research councils or busi-
ness sources. This went hand in hand with a relative reduction of funds from the min-
istry to the colleges (and the rest of the system).  The colleges that did not manage to 
                                                
4 The author was during that time director of one of these research foundations, feeling 
the increasing difficulty of achieving constructive cooperative models with the neigh-
bouring college. 
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increase their external funding, would soon feel the tightening grip of scarce re-
sources. But the ministry, as referred to above, was very restrictive as to which prac-
tical solutions the colleges could choose, especially any links with the system of re-
gional research foundations (the research colleges and universities met the same pro-
blems where they sought a tighter relationship with a research foundation). 
 
Second, industrially oriented research was given priority in the early and mid –80s, 
not least because Norway at that time had entered a serious recession, resulting in a 
high level of unemployment. Industrial R&D was increasingly seen as an important 
input to the process of industrial renewal and economic growth: 
 
”Norwegian industry today is altogether to much made up of industries sensi-
tie to business cycles. In addition, we produce to little of profiable products 
for high growth markets. Todays’ welfare is therefore highly vulnerable. The 
government wants to see an industry of greater variety with a larger potential 
for growth and adaptable vis-a-vis business cycles. This means that Norway 
not only must improve the existing industrial basis.  We must additionally de-
velop new industries, and this especially implies R&D intensive industry. It is 
a grave fact that we are not able to keep up with our competing nations in de-
veloping knowledge based industry” (St.meld.nr 28 (1988-89) (White Paper 
on research). 
 
The state colleges were underexploited in this context, and as the regional system of 
R&D by many was seen as ineffective in providing the practical knowledge base for 
the local industry, release of the state colleges knowledge stock became one of many 
approaches to an increased knowledge based industry. This included most of the tra-
ditional innovation policyinstruments at hand, but also an increased attention to the 
educational services that could be delivered from these colleges. The increasing pri-
ority given to the business-oriented, post-graduate education was evident in the 
White Paper on industrial development (St.meld.nr.53 (1988-89): 
 
”It is more difficult to achieve a rational organization of post-graduate educa-
tion  than for ordinary studies. This is, among other things, caused by short 
term studies, a large number of courses, that the activity is more temporary, 
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the market is variable and that the responsibility is divided on many actors. 
(…) Concerning the contact between the industry and the educational exper-
tise, the both parties must take the initiative. It is especially positive if educa-
tional services could be developed and organized that will ease the accessabil-
ity for the smaller and rurally based firms to the necessary post-graduate 
training capacity. This supply must be developed to meet the need for inter-
disciplinary competence”. 
 
The new, integrated colleges, state owned, but regional in location, were seen as an 
important instrument in this respect, both because they were expected to increase 
their R&D activity, because they were engaged in professional education and train-
ing at the level appropriate for many regional firms, and because external funding 
was supposed to increase as a share of the total revenue for the colleges. But it must 
be added that to bring in colleges in these ambitions, as became more concrete with 
RUSH, was a new approach, which also underlined the wider knowledge orientation 
in the industrial and innovation policies. 
 
All in all, the early –90s represented a period where new initiatives were seen as 
needed, and where R&D and the educational institutions were seen as a necessary 
ingrediant to the renewal of the industrial structure. At this time, reference was not 
made to ”innovation systems”, but attention was given to improving individual insti-
tutions’s role and functionability as providers of knowledge to the business commu-
nity. However, as stated above, the organizational solutions were not evident, and the 
colleges themselves needed an external pressure to take on this challenge on top of 
vast complexities that the college reform represented.  
The regional resources of state colleges 
The argument that the colleges represented resources that were underexploited from 
a business community point of view, is quite valid when regarding the basic num-
bers.5 In 1995 a total of 156 000 students were enrolled in the higher education sys-
tem, of whom 73 000 (47) were enrolled at the state colleges. They had 3 900 profes-
sional staff, of whom 170 were full professors or college professors (the latter a spe-
                                                
5 This section draws extensively on Arbo (1997:13-16) 
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cial invention of the –80s), 1200 assoiate and assistant professors, and more than 2 
300 lecturers and an additional 1000 college teachers.  
 
The state colleges represented ca 8% of the total R&D expenses of the total univer-
sity and college sector in Norway. The breakdown in table 1 shows, however that the 
R&D activity in the colleges is highly concentrated on what we call non-industrial 
areas. 
 
Table 1: R&D expenses and man-years relative to area and type of institution 
 
 State colleges Universities/research colleges 
Area R&D ex-
penses 
(mill.NOK) 
R&D-man ye-
ars 
R&D expenses 
(mill NOK) 
R&D man-
years 
Humanities 36.3 (12 %) 63 (13%) 395.2 (12%) 721 (10%) 
Social science 140.8 (48%) 245 (48%) 596,3 (18%) 1131 (18%) 
Nat.sciences 28.7 (10%) 41 (8%) 930.1 (27%) 1791 (28%) 
Technology 47.0 (16%) 88 (17%) 346.9 (10%) 688 (11%) 
Medicin 32.6 (11%) 53 (11%) 897.2 (26%) 1721 (27%) 
Agr. & fish. + 
vet. Med/techn 
8.9 (3%) 16 (3%) 220.1 (7%) 397 (6%9 
Total 294.3 (100%) 506 (100%) 3385.8 (100%) 6449 (100%) 
 
While the R&D efforts in the universities and research colleges are reasonably 
distributed across the areas, the state colleges are far more concentrated in so-
cial sciences. However, the colleges score high in technological areas. Most of 
this activity is funded by the basic budgets of the colleges (84%). But although 
the system of state colleges shows a great knowledge reserve, the table points to 
another fact: To little of the colleges’ professional resources is channeled into ex-
ternal R&D activity. The colleges are mainly educational institutions, and the 
R&D activitiy, as it is measured, has the primary aim of providing the quality 
assurance and development of the educational activity. But recent policy aims at 
changing this, RUSH being one case in point. 
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RUSH AS A PROGRAMME 
 
The Steinbeis legacy and the initiation of RUSH 
The RUSH programme was initiated in 1994. The context presented in the above 
chapter, illustrates the reasons behind this. In short, Arbo (1997:47) refers to four 
main reasons why the particular idea came up in discussions that the Norwegian In-
dustrial Association initiated with the Research Council of Norway: First, there was a 
general consensus that the research council should increase its efforts to enhance the 
technology transfer to and build-up of small and medium sized businesses. Recent 
activities in this field, like aiming at improving the technological and strategic capac-
ity of firms in the BUNT programme, were seen as positive, and consistent with the 
prevailing need for innovation oriented policies rather than R&D policies vis-a-vis 
this group of firms. Second, it was obvious that the research council had very limited 
contact with the sector of state colleges, providing only a tiny fraction of R&D fund-
ing. The research council was traditionally an institution for the universities, research 
colleges, the large sector of research institutes, and industry. The state colleges was 
seen as an underexploited source for local and regional economic development. 
Third, a certain frustration existed concerning the regional research foundations, a 
system that was originally set up to provide a regional nexus for R&D for industrial 
users, but that in general drifted to become research organizations in the traditional 
national R&D system. By activating the colleges, new models for regional innova-
tion could be developed.  
 
The frustration concerning the regional research foundations was linked to a notion 
of a system failure: The system of technology transfer and decentralized R&D that 
had been buildt up mainly in the –80s, had to some extent failed. It therefore became 
legitimate to open up for learning from lessons abroad, and the Steinbeis system in 
Germany was at this time brought into the preliminary activities for RUSH. Ove Aa-
nensen, former director of Agder Research Foundation, had for some time worked as 
a Norwegian industrial attachee in Stuttgart, and had taken quite an interest in this 
model.  
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The Steinbeis model for technology transfer is a tradition from Baden-Würtemberg, 
and represents a network of 220 transfer centres. These are essentially technical col-
leges at the same educational level as the Norwegian state colleges: 
 
”The concept comprises the exploitation of the existing infrastructure like 
teaching staff and equipment to provide the business community with 
consulting servives, research and development, continous and post-gradutate 
training, international technology transfer and project assessment. Each centre 
is an independent commercial unit, headed by a qualified staff with minimum 
five years of industrial experience. The Steinbeis foundation had in 1994 3 
300 employees. More than 15 000 projects were concluded during that year” 
(Arbo 1997:47-48, based on Report 1994, Steinbeis Foundation for Economic 
Promotion). 
 
Germany did not have a comprehensive system of independent R&D institutions like 
Norway. Rather, their system is based on fewer institutions in relative terms, but the 
ones they have are more integrated in the overall industrial traditions and policy. The 
Steinbeis system is one example, the Fraunhofer system of R&D institutes is another. 
The integrated and long term nature of the German model is not something that could 
be brought easily into the scattered industrial base and more experimental and tem-
porary nature of Norwegian policy. Hence, the system had to be translated. 
 
A programme committee was established in June 19946 . The commitee was made up 
of representatives from the research council, the industrial association, three main 
ministries, the state’s agency for industrial development (SND), two technological 
institutions, and the college of Østfold, one of the state colleges. The proceedings 
concluded with the idea of an experimental project in 2-4 counties with a minimum 
level of industrial base and colleges with an industrially relevant curriculum, and a 
minimum interest for a project of this kind. 
 
The support of the ministry of Research and Education was seen as necessary, and a 
subsequent meeting was held at their premises in August. The ministry’s concluded 
                                                
6 This section is based on Arbo’s (1997) mid-term evaluation of RUSH. 
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with a positive attitude, as long as the colleges were paid market rates for the ser-
vices, and as long as the activities were run by the colleges themselves and according 
to the regulations given by the ministry, mentioning in particular the rules and regu-
lations for cooperation with other private or public firms or institutions as described 
earlier (from the memo of the meeting, dated 8.8.94). The ministry itself proposed 
the colleges of Østfold, Agder, Telemark and Narvik. The latter was later abandoned 
due to the institutional and policyrelated characteristics of northern Norway. The col-
lege of Vestfold was chosen instead, mainly because there was no regional research 
foundation in this county, contrary to the other three. The next official meeting in the 
planning committee was to take place 24.8.94, to which the ministry was duely in-
vited (a first meeting had already been held 28.6.94). 
 
The research council organized seperate meetings with the chosen colleges in the 
middle of August, i.e. all took place before the upcoming planning meeting. The idea 
was to pave the ground for applications from these colleges that could later be dis-
cussed in the programme committee. The applications were supposed to demonstrate 
how the region would exploit the college’s competence in the development of the 
region, essentially linked to problemsolving and testing and testing, but also devel-
opment work.  
 
The meetings created a platform of common understanding, and represented an im-
portant baseline for the programme.7 One particular reason was the reference to the 
positive meeting that had been held a few days before with the minstry for research 
and education, giving authority to the colleges move into RUSH). The conditions 
turned out to be especially interesting in Vestfold, since the research council and the 
industrial association already had engaged in a cooperative project with the college. 
The aim was to develop a new concept for the teaching activities in which the busi-
ness community is drawn closer to the college in defining tasks and related issues. 
The concept was called PBL, or Problem Based Learning, in which the teaching is 
based upon the real problems of industry. The college had already been in touch with 
the University of Ålborg, Denmark, where the model has been a success.  It is 
worthwhile to cite the following statement in the memorandum: ”The college of 
                                                
7 The following is based on the memorandum from these meetings, dated 24.8.94. 
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Vestfold is free to let this project be integrated in their application”. The research 
council and the programme committee thus had prepared ideas on what they wanted 
to see in the applications. 
 
The programme committee meeting of 24.8.94 dealt with the recent processes with 
the ministry of research and education as well as the meetings with the colleges. Of 
the many issues that were discussed, special reference may be made to the statement 
”that quality assurance would have to be an important part of the objective, but that, 
on the other hand, one should not burden the new college boards with too much new 
and industrial since this would be unknown terrain to most of them” (memorandum 
from the committee meeting, dated 31.8.94).  
 
The process proceeded to the foreseen ”kick-off” meeting 16.9.94, with all involved 
parties, both funding ministries and agencies, the selected colleges, and others. This 
meeting developed further the consensual basis for the initiative (memorandum from 
the kick-off meeting dated 4.10.94), and it was communicated as an innovation pol-
icy incentive that Norwegian industry was not particularly innovative (16% of the 
firms have products younger than 3 years in their portfolio). During the discussion, 
the key institutions like colleges, the research council, and the ministry for research 
and education made prepared statements, the latter stressing again the need to com-
ply with the existing rules and regulations, but also pointing to the existing degrees 
of freedom and the recent policy statements to improve the colleges position and use-
fulness vis-a-vis industry. The meeting also covered information about other pro-
grammes amd initiatives for SMEs, implying that the idea of market rates for the ser-
vices offered by the colleges did not exclude funding from other parts of the support 
system, only that the funds available in the RUSH programme should not cover any 
costs in contracted projects.  
 
In sum, the initiative from the programme committee was well received, taking place 
parallell to the reform of the college system into 26 state colleges. Although the wor-
kload associated with the reform was great, the initiative could also help shape new 
profile of the colleges.All the four colleges had contacts with the industry, but in an 
ad hoc manner, not organized and mainly left to individual teachers. The implication 
of this was that positive results could be obtained for the business community, stu-
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students, teachers and the wider region if the supply of competence and infrastructure 
could be better organized. Although the work load due to the college reform was lar-
ge, the timing was seen as good, in so far as the college system was being shaped, 
and external pressures could be useful in the process of institutional change. 
 
Some preconditions and key issues were highlighted, some of which were contradic-
tory. It was stated that the services from the colleges should be delivered at market 
rates, but on the other hand, the college infrastructure should be ”freely” available for 
the business community. This, it is stated, will together with geographical proximity, 
lead to competitive advantages. No consideration is made at this point about the 
proper basis for this advantages, and who would benefit from them. Further, an 
improved incentive system system was seen as necessary, including use of working 
time, payments, and the system of meritocracy for this kind of work. Any local solu-
tions in this area would have to be accepted by the ”owner” of the colleges, the divi-
sion of universities and colleges in the ministry, and we may add here that this would 
prove a crucial test of the degrees of freedom for the colleges vis-a-vis the central-
ized fashion of state control. 
 
The relationsship to the regional research foundations that existed in three of the 
counties, were given particular consideration. Telemark had two, and these were both 
already engaged in the same sort of activities as the RUSH initiative. The challenge 
in this case was perceived as improving the relationsship between the research foun-
dation and the college. The same was true in Agder, where the college was large, 
with 6000 students and 500 professional staff, a system more than15 times greater 
than the professional resources of the research foundation. Although the practical co-
operation between the two had been limited, the research foundation had a long track 
record of contacts with industry. The memo concluded that a joint solution would be 
preferable. In Østfold, the college had very little industrial contact, the same being 
true vis-a-vis the research foundation STØ. The latter, however, had worked up a 
profile of practical development work for the local industry, a fact that was not dealt 
with in the memorandum. Vestfold had in this sense an open agenda to develop their 
own solutions.  
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Specific reference was made to the need for regional coordination of policy instru-
ments. The colleges were supposed to clarify their relative position vis-a-vis other 
support systems, including both initiatives run by the research council as well as oth-
ers. The financial solution for the programme was envisaged to fund 50% of the col-
leges costs to develop their organization, the rest should be derived from internal re-
sources and priorities. Any project or service delivered to industrial clients would 
have to be funded by these or co-funded through some other programme were the 
firms were eligible. 
 
Objectives and goals 
The programme memorandum was finalized in November 1994, and accepted for-
mally by the doard of the Industry and Energy division in the research council on the 
13.12.94. This took place almost in parallell with the processes in the four selected 
colleges, which developed their applications in the same period. We return to the 
contents and diversity of these applications below. 
 
The programme memorandum was based on the general idea to generate ”additional-
ity” in the colleges, i.e. to contribute to improved business relations beyond what the 
colleges would engage in anyway. The rationale for RUSH was linked to the idea 
that results from research and development should be made available and used in in-
dustry on a widest possible basis. This ”knowledge stock” argument was frame wit-
hin the need to diffuse knowledge to industry, and is therefore based on the need for 
a knowledge oriented industrial renewal, although the frame of reference in the 
preliminary work and the memorandum itself, is clearly a ”linear” model of technol-
ogy diffusion. On the other hand, the institutional focus on organizational change and 
adaption picks up essential elements of recent trends in innovation policy. RUSH is 
born between periods; with elements of the linear tradition as well as of orientation 
to learning and institutions. 
 
The memo states that it is important that the smaller, regional firms ”can make use of  
an infrastructure comprising both the necessary competence in addition to geogar-
phical proximity.” Further, smaller firms received only a tiny share of funds from the 
rsearch council, and RUSH represented an attempt to change this pattern. At the 
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same time, and this is the common ideology concerning this sector of firms, they rep-
resented ”a considerable potential for growth and employment”. The state colleges 
were one target institution in the process to activate the stock of knowledge for these 
firms. 
 
The programme’s objective is taken from the memo: 
 
”… to design and run a concept for contract activities vis-a-vis the regional 
industry as a means to enhance knowledge transfer from the college to small 
and medium sized firms. Initially, this programme will cover the colleges of 
Østfold, Telemark, Vestfold and Agder. Based on lessons to be drawn from 
these, similar initiatives towards other colleges will be considered” (page 1). 
 
This paragraph illustrates the experimental nature of the programme. The selcetion of 
the four colleges partly confirms this in the sense that a certain variety was achieved 
from which controlled learning could take place. In this sense, the formulation above 
of ”a concept” is somewhat lacking in precision, since the programme was designed 
to develop and test several models developed from regional contexts. 
 
The market baseline was given due consideration, undelining the ”commercial” prin-
ciple of the programme, which is to say to deliver services at market rates. The role 
of the research council was limited to help achieve the institutional or infrastructural 
change planned in each college, and no funding would be available for the industry 
itself. A key reference was made about the lasting nature of this activity: 
 
”An important objective of the programme is to establish the new approach as 
a lasting, integrated part of the colleges’ business. It is necessary to define the 
relationships to the regional research foundations and the public support sys-
tem” (page 2). 
 
Further goals and target definitions were to be related to each college’s project plans 
in the forthcoming applications. But the time horizon was to establich the regionally 
adapted models as an ongoing concern within 4 years, and that the business commu-
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nity makes use of the services provided through these models. The project applica-
tions were to develop goals and targets on: 
 
•= Commercial issues (external goals vis-a-vis the local firms); 
•= Infrastructure (internal goals to enhance commercial one. 
 
In an additional memo on ”guidelines for goalsetting”8 these were further develop to 
include a list of relevant indicators for the colleges to use in their planning process: 
 
Infrastructure: 
•= Integration of an industrial strategy in the college’s plans; 
•= Establish a cooperative body with the business community (and others) to co-
ordinate and improve the relations; 
•= Appoint a project manager and establish an organization and budgets; 
•= Relations with the business community as an item on the college board meet-
ing agenda xxx time a year; 
•= Increase the number staff with an industrial background; 
•= Increase the number of student thesis based on work for industry; 
•= Improve incentives to encourage staff to become industrially oriented; 
•= This means i.e. dealing with issues like reallocation of time, payments, mer-
tiable activities; 
•= Develop teaching and incentives to increase project cooperation and contracts 
from industry, monitor number of participants, etc; 
•= Number of students who chose industrially relevant studies; 
•= Registration of attitudinal changes in the college as well as in industry. 
 
Commercialization: 
•= Number of contracts/projects; 
•= Increase in number of contracts/projects; 
•= Development of number of business relations; 
•= Contracted sales volume; 
                                                
8 RUSH: Grunnlag for fastsettelse av mål. 
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•= Increase in this volume; 
•= Number of students taking jobs in the regional industry; 
•= Increase in this number; 
•= Industry’s own engagement in innovation and development; 
•= Increase in this engagement. 
 
The tasks to be accomplished was formulated with a dual attention to both industry 
as the receiving end of commercial services and the colleges as the producing end 
(Programme memorandum): 
 
The R&D tasks for the programme shall be carried out by the scientific staff 
with reference to the individual firms’ needs for the college’s competence and 
available resources. 
 
The financial means from the research council shall support: 
 
•= necessary internal resources to organize and develop the college’s ser-
vice to small and medium sized firms in the region 
•= marketing and information about the services 
•= internal support functions like equipment (not scientific9 to implement 
the programme 
•= programme management” (page 2). 
 
The target groups were directly related to the dual goal system; the industry and the 
colleges. The former was limited to small and medium sized firms with little or no 
R&D competence. But, it is said, more advanced firms may also be made a target 
group ”dependent on the competence of the college and the needs of the firms”. The 
latter was defined to be the best qualified staff, and to stimulate these to offer their 
services and knowledge to the programme. In addition, students were seen as an im-
portant group, limited to the students in their graduation years. 
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The implementation of RUSH implied the testing of the various models during the 
life time of the programme, and that a further diffusion to other colleges would be 
considered after a period of two years.  
 
The funding of RUSH came, as has become almost a norm in such cases, from the 
ministry of industry and ministry of regional affairs, providing the means of the re-
search council, 12 mill NOK each in total. The ministry of research and education 
participated  through the internal resources of the participating colleges, deemed to 
be 50% of the total costs, implying a cost level in total of 24 mill NOK.  
 
RUSH became institutionally based in the research council division for industry and 
energy, linked to several efforts to enhance technology transfer. Later, this activity 
was reorganized into a ”programme for technololy transfer” consisting of several in-
terlinked initiatives. Each project at college level was run by a seperate committee. 
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Four models: The regional shaping of RUSH 
RUSH was to be an experimental programme over 4 years to design and learn from 
the effectiveness of the approaches the colleges had chosen, and subsequently decide 
on whether to diffuse these models and lessons on a wider basis. The preparatory 
work so far did not contain any experimental design in a real sense: There was no 
reference made to comparative studies or any other rigorous approch to facilitate a 
legitimate learning process. It was later, however, in line with the recent tradition in 
the research council, carried out a mid-term evaluation (Arbo 1997, which is referred 
to repeatedly in this study). 
 
Although some commonality had been communicated, i.e. goalsetting and indicators 
to be used, the points of departure for each of the colleges were very diverse. Thus, it 
may have been somewhat surprising that the applications from the four turned out to 
be relatively similar (Arbo 1997). This reflected also the fact that the four were part 
of the same centralized system operating under the same national university and col-
lege act. The applications reflected the initiative from the research council, the ra-
tionale for RUSH in each case, a description of objectives, goals and targets, quality 
assurance, implementation plan and funding, all according to the principles commu-
nicated to them from the research council. However, the way they adhered to the de-
scription of infrastructure and commercial objectives differed, especially to the de-
gree they operationalized these into quantitative indicators. And more important, the 
way the models differed in practice based on informal choice, relations and proc-
esses, should prove to differ even more. 
 
With some minor modifications, the four applications were all accepted. All four col-
leges used considerable time for internal proceedings. And despite the fact that there 
was a high degree of commonality in the goalsetting, and that all four belonged to the 
same state system, the four developed into different models relative to situation pre-
sent i the region9 . 
 
                                                
9 Based on Arbo (1997) and interviews conducted in each college/region. 
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Østfold 
The model in Østfold was that of an office under the college umbrella, aimed at tar-
getting the market and linking market opportunities to college resources. However, 
RUSH has been headed by a project manager recruited from the college’s department 
for social science and foreign language. During the two first years, this project was 
less integrated in the college than during the next stage, when RUSH turned more 
into a matrix organization, combining a link between the project and the college or-
ganization. The college’s internal structure has delivered project managers and staff 
to RUSH, and the college’s management, including the departement manageres, is 
represented in the steering committee.  
 
Initially, some proactive activity was done vis-a-vis the industry, but with less suc-
cess than wanted. The firms were not willing to give priority to the time needed, and 
expected also co-funding from RUSH in case of any projects. This led to an attempt 
to initiate interest among the college staff , and over time valuable lessons were made 
on how to engage the college vis-a-vis industry. Further, and this shows the regional 
context in Østfold’s RUSH-programme, the main activity was guided into the stream 
of other support systems and programmes. Østfold was traditionally an industrial 
county, but having considerable problems with the structural change that became ur-
gent from the late –80s. The Norwegian government channeled 120 mill NOK into 
three structural change related programmes. Local and regional actors were supposed 
to join with a similar amount. This created a vast market for projects of various 
kinds, of which the college itself as well as the regional research foundation were 
heavily engaged. The initial period was therefore an important one in terms of mar-
keting and generating awareness  
 
The regional research foundation (StØ) was at that time distinctly separated from the 
college, growing in staff and turnover, not least due to the large ”programme market” 
in the county. Therefore, StØ’s problems were not financial ones, but related to 
growth with a qualified staff. Thus, there was no direct competition between the two, 
only for qualified staff, clients and programme funds (but not for the same projects). 
With the large programme market, and StØ busy in their R&D activity, many RUSH 
projects were initially carried out by external consultants, but generated by the 
RUSH initiative. Later, following increased attention from the college’s manage-
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ment, the staffe became more actively involved. In addition, the contacts with exter-
nal partners in industry and knowledge institutions developed. This underlines the 
unreleased potential for collaboration between the college and StØ, which, similar to 
the same settings in other regions, has been difficult to achieve. 
 
Even so, several projects drew on staff from these two institutions, and some of the 
projects led to improved communication channels with significant businesses and 
institutions. However, the relative high industry profile from the research foundation 
led RUSH into new attempts to become more integrated in the college. The years of 
1996-97 were mostly consumed for internal processes and attempts to integrate 
RUSH better to the college’s three departements. The common ideal, the RUSH ac-
tivity as a combined solution drawing on common resources for specific projects, has 
so far not been implementable. RUSH has therefore consentrated on training and 
education projects, leaving R&D to the research foundation. The college has recently 
tried to pull RUSH closer to the college, and more broadly across the college activi-
ties, not only covering the engineering and technology section, and as this in in line 
with the general intention of RUSH, irt does not contribute to a more coherent struc-
ture of the knowledge infrastructure in the county. 
 
In all, the RUSH activity in Østfold has produced the following lessons10:  
 
•= The staff’s will to engage in externally funded contract activity is a greater 
hindrance than its competence to do it; 
•= The ministerial regulations represent an obstacle to externelly funded activity, 
but not to the extent often presented; 
•= The bureaucratic decision making structure at the  college does make it poor-
ly equipped for professional and flexible relations with the business commu-
nity; 
•= The Business community has poor knowledge of the marketable competence 
in the college, and the college has gained much in presenting itself as a part of 
                                                
10 From a statement from RUSH Forum on the evaluation report conducted by Arbo 
(1997). 
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the knowledge infrastructure towards the business community through the 
RUSH-project. 
 
Vestfold 
Before the college reform there was some external activities vis-a-vis the business 
community, in particular through student exchanges and projects. Some activities 
were carried out for the shipping companies, due to a certain concentration of this 
industry in the region and  the departmenent of shipping had a turnover of ca 500 
000,- NOK yearly. Before RUSH was initiated, there had been an increasing atten-
tion to the need for a ”business plan” to further stimulate such activity. Still, without 
a particular pressure, this plan was in the planning stage. Therefore, RUSH was luck-
ily well timed, and the college, still in a major restructuring during the reform, 
established an internal group for the RUSH application, supported by a reference 
group with key external people. 
 
The business community was not primarily interested in pushing the contract activi-
ties in the college, but more the quality and scope of the college’s resources as such.  
 
The college of Vestfold hence chose its own path. The project manager was sup-
ported by managers for contracted activities in all the three departements of  mari-
time education, engineering and natural sciences and social sciences. These three 
gave priority to internal motivation among the staff, external contacts etc, while the 
project manager devoted time to organising the support systems for the RUSH activ-
ity as a whole. The strategic plan for the college, implemented in 1996, was followed 
by a detailed business plan for RUSH. RUSH became integrated in the three key de-
partements, anchored in the college’s management, and external contacts led to sev-
eral contracts for private and public clients. Throughout the early stages of RUSH, 
the level of externally funded projects rose steadily in all three departements. The 
local firms engaged in cooperative networks on an industry wide basis. RUSH today 
is the sales organization for all contracted activities, concentrating mainly on train-
ing, specific activities vis-a-vis the shipping industry, student projects and tests in the 
materials lab. In addition, there are other activities and contacts vis-a-vis the business 
community, such as cooperation in developing training courses and curricula. 
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The three key departements had very different traditions from before the reform. 
Thus, the development of a system for compensation and benefits became cumber-
some. But  the college management invested heavily in solving these issues, perceiv-
ing the ministerial regulations as unnecessarily strict and square-minded, but stretch-
ing the degrees of freedom that existed nonetheless. The solution was linked to the 
system of ”work plans” mandatory in all colleges. In this way, formal negotiations 
were avoided, and the negotiation process became integrated in the day-to-day man-
agement of the special agreement for scientific and professional staff at the state col-
leges. The work plans are actively used to defined externally funded activities, and 
hence integrate RUSH activities in the staff’s ordinary position. On the other hand, if 
extra time is necessary, the staff is paid on an hourly basis according to a special 
agreement for ”extra hours” (thus avoiding part-time positions). 
 
The compensation and benefits accruing to the staff, are divided in two: First, some 
get extra paid according to the afore mentioned scheme. Second, they may cover ex-
pences for professional activities and upgrading from the surplus of the RUSH activ-
ity. This system needs a careful balancing of the informal agreement vis-a-vis the 
staff that the one engaged in RUSH are the ones to get the benefits, against the rules 
laid down in the public audit system that these resources are relevant for all and to be 
decided by the board. Strict adherence to the formal rules is close to impossible, but 
the system in Vestfold does not allow significant financial benefits to those involved, 
a fact that is in line with the cautious approach of giving priority to the ordinary col-
lege activity of education. 
 
No regional research foundation existed in Vestfold, and this seems to be significant 
for the relative success of RUSH in this county. Parts of the industrial base had al-
ready been through structural changes, had become more R&D oriented than in the 
past. The initiative from the college in promoting RUSH was received positively by 
the business community, and the college’s engagement in more long-term, strategic 
work on innovation and industrial policy for the county and industrial partners can be 
seen partly as a result from the RUSH-project. 
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The lesson from Vestfold is that RUSH has been a significant development of or-
ganization and routines that would not have taken place with the current momentum 
without RUSH. The system developed for the three key departements will be ex-
tended to the other two, thus penetrating all contract activities for the whole college. 
Organizationally as well as financially, the RUSH programme has had a significant 
degree of additionality, although the latter success is somewhat exaggerated though 
including turnover that existed independent of RUSH.  
 
Telemark 
In Telemark, the college was itself scattered into many smaller sites. The regional 
research foundation was already well established, and consisted of three separate in-
stitutions, two of them with an industrial profile. As elsewhere, some tensions existed 
between these two categories, the research foundations typically being vulnerable 
and suspicious towards any marketorientation from the state college, fearing an en-
croachment in their market. Before RUSH, the industrially related activity had been 
only individually based with nor systematic approch from the college’s side. The ex-
ception was student projects for industrial firms, and to some extent consultancy ser-
vices for the tourism industry. 
 
When RUSH came on the scene, an internal process of mobilization started. In addi-
tion key external actors were organized into a supervisory board, the chairman being 
the principal of the college. Two of the research foundations were also represented 
on this board, and the first year was devoted to negotiate agreements with these and 
with the college staff. The overall result was a turf sharing between the college and 
the research foundations, while the directors of the two research foundations repre-
sented on the board showing clear signs of resistence to RUSH.  A particular result 
was that the college could develop a market for smaller industrial projects, student 
projects, and training activities, while the larger projects vis-a-vis the business com-
munity should continue to be provided by the research foundations. The new agree-
ment between the parties was very explicit on this point  
 
The wide and scattered basis for interest mobilization did not provide the momentum 
for RUSH, and the RUSH management at the college was not given sufficient room 
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to move. To increase legitimacy and improve networks and infrastructure, parts of 
the RUSH financial basis were used to subsidize projects initiated by the college, e.g. 
market research, development of new educational programmes, enhancement of labs, 
and to early stages of industrial projects, a way to use RUSH resources that was 
slightly out of line with their intentions.R 
 
RUSH became linked to two out of five departements, but was organizationally lim-
ited to the RUSH office providing administrative support and initial activities for 
specific projects. The RUSH projects themselves came to be organized and ac-
counted for in the respective departements, with the consequence that only the ”ex-
penditure side” of RUSH became visible in the RUSH office, while the revenues 
were all accounted for in the departements. This will underestimate the size and role 
played by RUSH in HiT. 
 
The internal negotiations with the staff proved to confirm the weak basis for financial 
incentives that were perceived to exist. The staff were difficult to mobilize because 
of the low level of financial opportunities in the concept of RUSH, and the participat-
ing staff consisted therefore of a relatively low number of people who repeatedly 
took, and take, part in RUSH projects. The direct effects of RUSH are thus limited. 
 
RUSH will continue to exist, but will grow to contain all externally funded activities 
at the college. However, it will remain integrated at the departemental level, albeit 
extended to those not involved so far. So even if the directs effects of the RUSH pro-
gramme were limited, the main effects are indirect as RUSH helped reorganize the 
overall external activity at the college and integrate it with other programs.  
 
Agder 
A very different model developed in Agder. This twin county has the largest state 
college in Norway, and a research foundation that from the very beginning had been 
highly profiled towards industry. The college had initiated another program to im-
prove the college’s activities vis-a-vis industry (SESAM, or centre for cooperation 
with industry), and RUSH could build upon this, among other things by letting the 
existing project manager take over RUSH and thus integrate the two. The activities 
38 STEP  Working Paper  A-02/1999 
 
 
initiated towards the business community turned out to be succesful, confirming mu-
tual interest and a tradition of cooperation that also included the research foundation. 
However, the internal processes turned out to be cumbersome, the staff, as was the 
case also in the other colleges, were not positive since they would not increase their 
salary or retain any economic compensation11, and the conclusion was drawn that the 
college was not adaptable to the market oriented requirements from RUSH. 
 
The research foundation (AF) became the obvious alternative, a market and project 
oriented contract research institute with a well known reputation in the business 
community and flexible organizational solutions. AF had its headquarters in Kris-
tiandsand, with the college, and a technical-industrial department in Grimstad, next 
to the college’s division of technology and engineering. There had up to that time 
been considerable financial difficulties with AF’s Grimstad departement, and little 
support from the college, perceiving that AF’s activitiy was isolated from the scien-
tific and professional base in the college. AF was at that time in the process of down-
sizing its departement, and in general looking for improved relations with the col-
lege. The AF management was also attentive to ithe structural challenge of more in-
tegrated solutions in the region, and when the RUSH initiative came, they held meet-
ings with both the research council and the ministry for local government and labor 
relations, arguing that the sector based approach would contribute to a disintegration 
regionally.12 
 
RUSH was established in Grimstad, implicit with the understanding that RUSH was 
a technical-industrial activity. The first year, RUSH was run within the college, as a 
continuation of SESAM. When this model proved cumbersome, in particular because 
it did not facilitate the necessary incentive structure, it became clear that another, and 
more ”commercial”, model was needed.  
 
The initiative from the college to discuss a common solution for RUSH was dis-
cussed reperatedly in the board of the research foundation,13 and a consensus was rea-
                                                
11 Contrary to the Steinbeis model, where the staff does retain economic benefits. 
12 Similar frustrations were appearant also in the other regional research foundations. 
13 It should be noted that this author at that time was, and still is, a member of that 
board. 
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reached, implying a reorganization of the technical-industrial activity of the research 
foundation, which was at that time an economic burden, into a new Center for Tech-
nology under the organizational umbrella of the latter, but highly integrated in and 
drawing resources from the college. The college staff can in this case take part in ex-
ternal contract activities as staff of the research foundation and thus avoid the limita-
tions of college regulations. 
 
The project manager for this new entity was recruited from industry, which gave the 
center legitimay and networks. A solution had been found that had both support from 
the college and the research foundation, pulling together the comparative advantages 
of both. And it was clrarly linked to specific requirements from the college: the com-
bined model with AF should be based firmly on the scientific areas of priority in the 
college, not on AF’s former R&D activity in Grimstad. The combines model became 
SENTEK, organized as a centre in AF, but drawing on resources in the college. 
 
The early initator of RUSH as such, Ove Aanonsen, was recruited to build the RUSH 
system. Being a former director of AF, he was also sensitive to the combined needs 
of the two institutions. Further, he also had insight into the real Steinbeis system, in 
particular the need for workable financial incentives for the college staff. This was in 
line with the philosophy of the local dean, who gave more attention to results and 
mobilizing staff than respecting state regulations. Therefore, a system developed mo-
re in line with the Steinbeis model, in which the college staff could retain their share 
of project revenues through working in the AF umbrella. The dean tries to reduce the 
teaching burden of the staff active in SENTEK. 
 
This model developed out of informal understanding and agreements locally, based 
on the idea of meeting common interests. Hence, even if the staff through their na-
tional union structure was part and parcel of national level agreements restricting 
their use of time and ability to earn additional income in outside institutions, the 
SENTEK model represents an informal agreement to do otherwise. Although 
SENTEK is not in line with the rules and regulations from the ministry of research 
and education, it represents potentially an effective organization and incentive sys-
tem to realize the RUSH intentions as well as a mechanism to integrate the two parts 
of the innovation system. In particular, the two mother institutions are able to share 
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the legitimacy and reputation arising from this model. Additionally, it may prove to 
be a nexus in the regional structure: Recently, the Swedish based Ericsson company 
opted to move its engineering and R&D activities from the area to Oslo. This created 
an upheaval where both counties (east and west) joined forces and managed to  turn 
the decision around. The turnaround led to further decisions from other firms and 
some agglomeration of industrial R&D and innovation activities were clustered in 
the college and SENTEK area.  
 
The models in perspective 
In sum, the four RUSH models are regionally shaped, adapted to the specific condi-
tions in each case. In the Østfold case, the entry costs of a new initiative in the midst 
of a high level state funded activity and low college interest were relatively high, in 
so far as the research foundation had already captured ”the industrial role” and was 
well trained to take advantage of the support system. In Vestfold, RUSH was used as 
a tool for an innovation, a new profile for the college was developed, taking advan-
tage of lack of competitors and thus low entry costs. In Telemark, tension existed 
between the various interested parties, and a cumbersome process of negotiating a 
division of labor between the college and the research foundations took place. The 
result was a marginal role left to the RUSH. In Agder, RUSH came as an external 
impulse into processes of reorganizing and development of cooperative solutions be-
tween the research foundations and the college. The politics for the new integrated 
model were favourable, and RUSH became a means to integrate two essential parts 
of the support system. It should also be noted that the politics of the Agder counties 
in general are in favor of R&D and innovation policy, thus creating a robust system 
of support for the development of key institutions. 
 
RUSH and the question of consistency 
In this section the external and internal consistency is preliminarily assessed. As 
mentioned, RUSH as a programme has to be seen relative to the design of REGINN 
to which we will return. We will therefore return to a wider assessment of consis-
tency of the link between the two.  
 
Rushing to Reginn: The evolution of a semi-institutional approach 41
 
 
The external consistency of RUSH is a complicated issue. At face value, RUSH is 
external consistent, measured against the lessons from innovation theory as such. 
RUSH is a programme that builds upon key elements of innovation theory, like the 
need to promote institutional change to enhance interactive learning, the need to de-
velop solutions based on the regional context, and to link the different elements of 
the support system. The objectives, methods and target groups are valid within the 
framework of recent innovation theory, also the body of theory that emphasises re-
gional systems of innovation. The need to promote proximity between the colleges 
and the industry is an important element of this, including the idea that both parties 
are supposed to gain inputs, innovative ideas and impulses for change. One example 
of this is the need to engage industry in developing the educational programmes, 
curricula and specific projects and tasks in the colleges. 
 
The RUSH programme can also be seen as externally consistent in the sense that it 
adds an instrument in the bundle of programmes being promoted from the research 
council within the context of what was to be called the programme for technology 
transfer. To release the potential buried in the state colleges was a highly legitimate 
objective, not least beacuse of the positive lessons brought in with the Steinbeis 
model. Even if recent innovation theory stresses a systemic view, i.e. the need to fo-
cus on the wider system of innovative elements and how they interlink, this does not 
preclude as rational the attempt to develop a single component of these systems with 
the specific aim also to improve their relations with surrounding support systems.  
 
There are, however, some considerations concerning the external consistency. The 
relationsships between RUSH and the role of the state seems problematic. RUSH is 
not a regional programme, it is part of a decentralized national policy, initiated by 
national level institutions. The inconsistency between RUSH and the state’s central-
ized control of the operation of the colleges is appearant, leading to tensions and di-
verse expectations in the processes of building the regional RUSH models. Even as it 
turned out to be possible to move around some of the tight norms and regulations gi-
ven by the ministry of research and education, the colleges had to adhere to them, 
and any innovation in this system was not considered by the ministry. The institu-
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tional innovation at the regional level had a hard fight against the non-innovative 
norms of centralized regulations14. 
 
The same, to some extent, goes for the relationship with the surrounding support sys-
tem. This was not particularly considered at the outset, at least not the prevailence of 
heavy state intervention in Østfold. The regional research foundations, a system that 
had been set up in the –80s to provide much the same services that RUSH aimed at, 
had to some extent been squeezed between this formal intention and lacking re-
sources to fullfill them. It is a case in point that while a better coordination and pos-
sibly reorganization was foreseen in the relationship between these two, only the col-
leges became part of the programme. The infrastructural goals was, for all practical 
purposes, limited to the colleges. The solution in Agder, where RUSH ended up in a 
collaborative model with the research foundation, ran the risk of being unacceptable 
to the ministry of research and education, even if it could be seen as the most rational 
thing to do in a region where the research foundation was a well established part of 
the system and offered the flexibility that the college could not. 
 
The larger question that arises is the following: What can be expected, and what is 
the consistency, of a minor experimental programme trying to achieve lasting chan-
ges in the relations between the state colleges and surrounding industry, against the 
governmental norms, state interventions and previously established support system? 
Or more precisely, what is the functional significance of a programme for institutio-
nal innovation when it is contradicted by other activities and regulations from the 
state itself? Our preliminary answer is that it is very limited, especially as the objec-
tive dis not include any changes and reforms in the state regulations governing this 
sector to allow for decentralization and innovation on the regional level. Regional 
innovation seems like a contradiction in terms in a highly centralized society as 
                                                
14 The high degree of centralization in Norway may be illustrated by the institution of 
”fylkesmann” the state’s representative in each county. While the county itself, being 
run by a political assembly, mainly deals with administration of schools and hospitals 
and other infrastructure, the state’s representative has a supervisory role, has resources 
on key regional areas like agricultural policy, and conveys the influence of the state even 
beyond the powers of the institution itself: Many of the fylkesmanns staff is under direct 
authority of the central ministry, leaving the head of the office with a partial authority 
vis-a-vis the staff.  
Rushing to Reginn: The evolution of a semi-institutional approach 43
 
 
as Norway. Before we enter into emprical issues, we take the assumption that RUSH 
was only needed in Vestfold, since this county did nor have any R&D support system 
and had to evolve out of an innovative college. The Agder model might have been 
realized anyway, given the conditions, Østfold was overburdened with other money, 
leaving RUSH with an insignificant role, and Telemark ended in a slightly more ra-
tional division of labour between the college and the research foundation, albeit to a 
high price. 
 
Is RUSH internally consistent? 
The issue of internal consistency relates essentially to three aspects: The existence of 
well defined objectives and goals, consistency between goals and means, and rational 
criteria for defining target groups. 
 
Given the structure of the programme, the question is not easy to answer. At face 
value, the objectives and goals are, on a programme level, clearly defined. The dou-
ble structure of objectives, infrastructure and commercial, are in line with other pro-
grammes in the so-called programme for technology transfer in the research council. 
The formulation of these objectives is provided so as to facilitate a decentralized 
goal-setting process  in the colleges, also under the influence of a common set of 
ideas for what could be rational objectives. Thus, the overall system of objectives as 
well as the decentralized process in which the total system of objectives and goals 
was shaped, complying with the need to decentralize responsibility and initiative, 
support the argument of consistency. 
 
The relationship between goals and means (the classic condition for rationality) is 
more difficult. This is mainly so because RUSH itself provides marginal means to 
fulfill the objectives. Each college receives 1 mill NOK pr year, representing 50% of 
the costs for the colleges’ efforts. The practical means are left to the colleges to put 
in place. Hence it is critical for the programme’s success that the colleges are able to 
exploit the options available to them. 
 
This raises the question of additionality. If the programme’s relative modest means 
result in achieving the intended results in the colleges’s relationship with its envi-
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ronment, through helping the exploitation of complementary and ”hidden” resources, 
then the internal consistency is high (this illustrates that internal consistency can not 
be assessed in isolation from issues related to external consistency). But as such, the 
consistency is assessed to be low, since success locally rests on a number of depend-
encies that are not internalized in the programme itself. 
 
Of the double objective, the infrastructural is seen as the most important15. This me-
ans that target groups for the programmes should be defined at the college level, not 
in the wider industrial and regional environment. The criteria and choice of target 
groups are therefore also tightly interwoven with, if not the same as, the experimental 
design of the programme. The baseline for selecting the colleges was the notion of 
being situated in a region with a minimum of industrial activity and tradition. This 
main criteria was fulfilled. Further, there should be some contextual variety: different 
situations when it comes to the regional research foundations, different structures in 
the support system etc. These considerations seem to be reasonably reflected in the 
selection. But given the experimental nature of the programme, the criteria for the 
target groups necessarily feed back into the relationship between objectives and 
means. And here we find the missing link: There is no strategy for robust compara-
tive research evaluating the developments and results of the four cases along the 
selected dimensions of target groups. The key ingredient for policy learning, a neces-
sary element in a true experimental design, does not exist clearly formulated at the 
programme level.  
 
                                                
15 Interview with programme coordinator in the research council. In the TEFT pro-
gramme, the business or the commercial objectives were deemed the most important 
(Remøe 1998).. 
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Results and effectiveness 
 
Cooperation and marketing 
The individual organizational models are discussed elsewhere in the paper. The col-
leges had diverse conditions for the development of RUSH in each case. A common 
framework was the programme committee and later the programme for technology 
transfer in the research council. The research council, being responsible for RUSH, 
wanted to avoid an uncoordinated developmet of RUSH models in each region. 
Thus, after the RUSH projects were initiated, a follow-up meeting was organized, 
and the research council introduced the idea of a coordinative and cooperative body, 
the RUSH Forum. This was essentially meant to be a learning facility, providing in-
formation exchange and coordination of activities and issues of common interest. 
The research council and other institutions may take part as observers (Arbo 
1997:70). 
 
The meetings in RUSH forum have had the following main issues on the agenda: 
 
•= Common profile and marketing; 
•= Payments and accounting issues; 
•= Contracting issues; 
•= Target or impact indicators 
•= Quality assurance of projects. 
 
RUSH Forum also initiated contacts with external institutions, like the Educational 
council for engineers (Ingenriørutdanningsrådet), and the Association of technology 
based firms (TBL).  
 
Although the individual colleges entered on different tracks, the RUSH Forum hel-
ped reinforce and improve the marketing efforts vis-a-vis the regional industry, and 
facilitated feedbacks from lessons that the colleges made in their specific setting and 
activities.  
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Business and infrastructural indicators 
As mentioned, the colleges developed their own set of objectives and targets for their 
RUSH-activities, based on a common framework suggested by the research council. 
The individual versions reflected the particular context, but were similar in nature. 
To ease the monitoring on the programme level, a reporting system was developed in 
which some key indicators were made common for all colleges involved in RUSH. 
These indicators were the baseline of the yearly reports from the RUSH-colleges to 
the RUSH programme committee, and were developed in the above mentiond RUSH 
Forum.  
 
Admittedly these indicators, presented and discussed below, are crude measures on 
the total activity in RUSH. To avoid too much detail in this analysis, we will not de-
scribe the range of activities in each college, but stick mainly to the common set of 
reported indicators. However some discussion is provided on each college’s profile. 
The empirical material presented below, is based on the yearly reports. Arbo (1997) 
has made a preliminary analysis of these in his mid-term evaluation of RUSH (for 
1995 and 1996), and the tables below are extended with data from 1997 and also 
adapted to fit the present purpose better. Thus, the indicators of the development of 
RUSH are: 
 
•= The volume of the RUSH activity; 
•= The SME profile; 
•= Mobilization of staff; 
•= Student projects for firms. 
 
Table  2 shows the volume of the RUSH activity measured in registered industrial 
contacts, contracts for various services and the economic value in turnover. There 
might be uncertainties in these data due different registration routines, a problem that 
we are not able to  
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Table  2:   The volume of the RUSH activity 
 
 Registered contacts Number of contracts Turnover(1000kr)) 
 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
HiØ - 41 55 3 12 na 0 952 2.772** 
HiV 245 260 73* 88 129 98 2.860 5.223 6.895*** 
HiT 20 68 75* 1 6 13 0 591 710**** 
HiA 31 33 50 9 8 28 445 297 4.400***** 
* Uncertain data; ** This figure covers only RUSH, HiØ has a total externally 
funded activity of 8 mill NOK in 1997. The figure in the table includes also in-
sourced consultants acting as subcontractors; ***Includes all externally funded ac-
tivities; ****Only RUSH office, RUSH projects are accounted for in the respective 
departements, total externally funded activities at the college are 10.8 mill NOK in 
1997;*****Only SENTEK activities. 
 
 
solve in this paper. But the table still shows at face value an interesting picture. The 
college of Vestfold stands out with a far higher level of activity, also measured in 
turnover. The registered contacts at this college in 1997 is probably due to registra-
tion mistakes. The general picture is that all four are showing a positive develop-
ment, but with different speed and profile. The activity in Agder has a steady pro-
gress, but the jump in turnover is probably related to establishment of SENTEK, 
whereby this new institution pulled together activities from both the research founda-
tion and the college. Thus, this new organization seems to be successful, also taking 
into account that it is more focused on R&D projects than the other three. The case of 
Telemark seems to be the most problematic. The low level of contracts does not add 
upp with the number of contracted services in Arbo (1997), registered with 100. The 
latter seems to be the total activities including the R&D activities in the research 
foundations, while these are not counted in the college’s volume. At face value, 
compared to the other three, this college is lagging behind, but the numbers are 
symptomatic of the division of labor that has been agreed upon in Telemark, leaving 
the R&D projects to other institutions. On the other hand, the picture in the table is 
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highly influenced by different measurement routines at the the four colleges. Al-
though we do not know the total numbers for Agder, the three colleges of Østfold, 
Telemark and Agder have an external profile exceeding that of the RUSH activity 
itself. 
 
The commercial or business development objective of RUSH was linked to generat-
ing services for SMEs in particular. In table 3 the SME profile of the RUSH activi-
ties is shown, the SMEs in this case being firms with less than 100 employees. The 
table reveals that noe of the college are able to generate a consistent SME profile, 
albeit one should bear in mind that the definition of SME being less than 100 is very 
restrictive in this case. The large 
 
Table 3:  The SME profile of RUSH (% of turnover) 
 
             SME      Larger firms           Other 
 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
HiØ 0 26 66 55 21 28 45 53 na 
HiV* 7 5 2 75 80 66 18 15 32 
HiT Na 41 57 na 59 43 na na na 
HiA 46 26 27 40 74 73 14 0 0 
  *Arbo (1997) reports that the shipping clients are categorized as larger firms even 
though they are by definition SME. 
 
intervention programmes by the state is clearly part of the picture in Østfold. How-
ever, the data shows a significant shift from programme dependency to SME orienta-
tion in 1997, a shift that was part of the action programme established to give new 
momentum to the RUSH activity from that year. For all colleges there is a measure-
ment problem: The data reported does not distinguish between contracts directly for 
the firms and contracts for other institutions or programmes that are indirectly related 
to firms. Even so, the profile is rather SME independent, and the college of Vestfold 
provides an interesting example. Being the college mostly consentrated on training 
services for the business community, these activities are largely for larger firms. 
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A key indicator of the infrastructrual objective is the ability to mobilizes college staff 
into the RUSH projects. Even if the college itself manages to develop better routines, 
systems incentive systems etc, i.e. develop organizational changes along the objec-
tive of RUSH, the ”moment of truth” is the degree to which staff is actually mobi-
lized. This is shown in table 4:   
 
Table  4:   Mobilization of college staff (numbers and share) 
 
  1995   1996   1997 Total no. of 
staff* 
% after 3 
years 
R&D man-
years in res. 
found. 
HiØ     9    17    17   217/95**     9/18***       44 
HiV   36    41    45   156/75**   29/60***         - 
HiT     2    13    23   302/112**     8/21***       62 
HiA   13    13    22   398/75**     6/29***       26 
Total   60    84  107 1073/357**   10/30***     132 
*Professional staff, -96 data, **Professional staff for those departements that are 
linked to the RUSH programmes; ***Mobilization of staff relative to relevant 
departements. 
 
The data from 1995 to 1997 show the aggregate development in this period. Again, 
the college of Vestfold stands out, both in the rapid mobilization of college staff, and 
the persistent higher number of staff involved. There has been positive trends in the 
other colleges as well. But the particular position of Vestfold is further confirmed 
when taking into account the degree of mobilization: close to one third of the staff is 
mobilized into a wide range of especially training activities for the local industry, 
while the other are not reaching fully 10%. When correcting for the mobilization 
from relevant departements, Vestfold is still high, although the others reaches a fair 
mobilization degree. This picture also shows that a fruitful relationship with the local 
industry does not have to be based on technical R&D activities, but other ways of 
knowledge dissemination and cooperation.  
 
We have also included data on the available man-years in the respective regional re-
search foundations. These only confirm that the development in the college of Vest-
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fold is to some extent compensating for the lack of another institution for contracted 
knowledge services in the region. And they also show the large potentional in the 
colleges to increase their networks with the surrounding industry and other clients, 
leaving aside the fact that the colleges’ main mandate is to run educational pro-
grammes for enrolled students. 
 
However, the ability to mobilize students into projects for the local industry is a key 
indicator of infrastructural adaption. This pattern is shown in table 5, giving the dis-
tributed profile  
 
Table 5:  Number of student projects for clients 
 
          SME      Larger firms         Other 
 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
HiØ    -   30   17   -    18  12   -   22   13 
HiV   66   41   45   4   39   30   23   33   12 
HiT   33   55   na   46   48   Na   29   21   na 
HiA   26   18   24   19   27   18     0     0     3 
 
across the earlier categorization. The table shows in general that the student projects 
are more related to SMEs than the contracted activities by the college staff. There is 
no other appearant pattern in these data, expect for the possible tendency of the Ag-
der model to stick to business clients and not link this this activity other client 
groups.  
 
Effectiveness and issues of college-industry cooperation 
The overall impact of RUSH must be assessed beyond the crude indicators of the ta-
bles above. Already in the programme’s mid-term was it evident that the RUSH pro-
gramme had positive impacts (Arbo 1997:82-83, 1998:7): 
 
•= Contract activities and improved profile vis-a-vis the regional industry has 
entered the agenda and is a recurring item in the management and boards of 
the colleges; 
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•= The staff has had to relate to this agenda, even if a minority has been mobi-
lized; 
•= Considerable efforts have been made to improve the colleges’ ability to han-
dle contract activities; 
•= The colleges focus more on developing their range of services and are thus 
innovating; 
•= Key lessons have been made concerning the administrative and financial sys-
tems at the colleges, giving inputs to clarifying the degrees of freedom that 
exist within the current system of state regulations and national agreements; 
•= The colleges have improved their position as an asset in the regional econ-
omy, and are able to demonstrate this to improve the support and legitimacy; 
•= The colleges have tried to improve the coordination with other programmes 
and support systems, including in two cases repositioning vis-a-vis the re-
gional research foundations. 
 
It is difficult to assess whether these preliminary impacts will lead to firm changes or 
a consistent evolution of the colleges’s role in the respective regions. We will return 
to such broader issues below. But the lessons from RUSH so far relate to significant 
and systemic features in and between the system components. Arbo (1998) points to 
both internal and external obstacles: 
 
•= The habits and identity of college staff, seing themselves mainly as teachers 
for college students. This implies a certain conservatism and scepticism to-
wards external, market based work; 
•= The work load at the college is itself high, even rising in association with the 
college reform taking place in parallell with the initiation of RUSH; 
•= The system of recognition, or meritocracy, is similar to that of the universi-
ties, and few ”credits” are given to staff performing the kind of work intended 
in RUSH. The colleges are not allowed, in the context of national regulations, 
to use economic incentives beyond the existing system of remuneration; 
•= The decision making system is very complex, and the colleges are subject to 
fixed routines for planning and executing educational programmes, leaving 
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little room for the innovation and implementation of extra-curricular activi-
ties; 
•= The lack of an appropriate administrative support system made the RUSH 
initiative cumbersome to implement. Even the development that has taken 
place within the RUSH programme does not provide the systems change that 
was needed; 
•= The industrial sector has little knowledge of the colleges and what they could 
offer. This is especially the case in the SMEs; 
•= The typical SME spend their full time on day-to-day problem solving, making 
it difficult to initiate the long term strategic work that would spur a demand 
for the services that the colleges could offer; 
•= The firms are not willing to pay market prices. Demand seems to require sub-
sidized services which eventually have to be generated through integration 
with other parts of the support system; 
•= The specific pattern of specialization among the colleges does not necessarily 
match the potential demand in the regions; 
•= The colleges are still amateurs in a competitive market. Confidence and repu-
tation that are a prerequisite for a competitive position, gives other institu-
tions and consulting firms a leading edge. 
 
All this suggests that the regional system, of which the colleges are a part, cannot be 
changed without some sincere, national level policy intervention. It also seems clear 
that the colleges are placed in a position where they have tremendous challenges of 
negotiation, both to develop systems and motivations internal in the colleges and in 
particular within the chain of command from the ministry, as well as with external 
institutions and potential clients. The emerging models of regional innovation sys-
tems, or changes in them, can therefore be seen as dependent on how these negotia-
tions produce certain outcomes. We propose, therefore, a bargaining theoretical view 
on regional innovation systems, defined as the particular set of negotiated outcomes 
derived from these processes, a perspective to which we shall return.  
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Regional models and policy coordination 
Seen in isolation, RUSH does have impact, albeit through rather different models and 
mechanisms in the four cases. However, there are some crucial issues to be discussed 
that relate to the wider impact of RUSH. 
 
First of all, the institutional strategy behind RUSH needs to be considered. Especially 
in Vestfold, this strategy can be seen as successful. This may be explained by the low 
entry costs in this region, stemming from the lack of a regional research foundation 
which the college would have to relate to. The college of Vestfold could initiate a 
strategy of scale, aiming at paving the way for increasing the level of external activ-
ity in the region. The others had more difficult contexts to handle. The system of re-
search foundations, programmes, small and large intervention schemes etc, forced 
the others into a more cumbersome strategy of scope, where the colleges were im-
plicitly given the mandate to improve the level of coordination between the different 
components of the innovation system. Although this mandate cannot be taken liter-
ally, and it was of course never communicated as such vis-a-vis the rest of the sys-
tem, this part of the objective forced the colleges into a timeconsuming process of 
negotiating a position for themselves. The three models that arose can all be seen in 
light of particular relations to the research foundations in each county. Thus, the con-
clusion so far is that any significant change or improvement in the regional innova-
tion system cannot take place without negotiations among the people and institutions 
in question. The regional innovation system evolve through successive negotiated 
outcomes within the straight jacket of a strategy of scope. The college of Vestfold, 
sticking to a strategy of scale, could limit the negotiations internal to the college.  
 
It may be useful at this point to examine the idea of negotiation more closely. In bar-
gaining theory, a key distinction is often made between distributive and integrative 
bargaining (Lewicki and Litterer 1985; Bazerman et al. 1985). In general, distribu-
tive bargaining refers to the win-lose or competitive situation: ”The goals of one 
party and the attainment of those goals are in fundamental and direct conflict with 
the goals of the other party” (Lewicki and Litterer 1985:76). The resources are, or are 
defined to be, fixed and limited, and the parties will typically design strategies to 
maximize his/her shares of the outcome. The situation is one of interdependence, 
since the position of party cannot be defined without the reference to the other. 
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In contrast, integrative bargaining ”…is the process of identifying a common, shared, 
or joint goal and developing a process to achieve it” (ibid:102). This will often mean 
that the parties define the problems at hand as common or shared, and that by col-
laborating, the ”cake to be shared” may increase, and both parties may be better off. 
This mode of bargaining is often seen as opposite to the distributive, and may in ma-
ny situations represent a track in which new solutions satisfying the goals of both 
parties are developed. 
 
In our case, the college of Vestfold avoids the issue, or more precisely, can limit the 
issue to the internal stage of the college. In Telemark, a typical distributive situation 
was created, where tensions and positioning resulted in a division of labor to secure 
the status qou. In Østfold, the implicit process was similar, leaving the RUSH project 
as a ”stand alone” unit chasing external revenues, but to a minor degree drawing on 
resources from the college. In Agder, we find the case of integrative barganing, 
through which both the college and the regional research foundation found common 
problems and common ground, and developed a new organizational model integrat-
ing the goals of both parties. Thus, the strategy of scope will produce different results 
depending on the nature of the negotiation process. And more importantly, the re-
gional institutional system for innovation develops different structures.  
 
This leads to a further argument. The lessons from the three ”negotiating” colleges 
can be seen as a pattern in which the national level, through a national programme, 
more or less tries to initiate improved coordination regionally through decentralized 
actions. Or in other words: The state’s objective is implicitly, by decentralization, to 
improve a system of which the problems are partly stemming from the state level. 
Given the degree of centralization in Norway, where most of the support system op-
erating regionally is designed nationally, RUSH can be seen as a way for the state to 
rid itself of responsibility for adding on programmes, institutions and initiatives that 
over time and in sum produces a sub-optimal system. Inconsistencies that stem from 
the national level can be solved on the regional level with less political-economic 
noise. However, this argument only partially holds, since the state is not a single, co-
herent entity: The RUSH programme itself can also be seen as the sectoral competi-
tion between ministries and agencies, some of which are initiating horisontal initia-
Rushing to Reginn: The evolution of a semi-institutional approach 55
 
 
tives, but having to challenge the ”constant variable” of nationally negotiated out-
comes of norms, regulations and laws associated with the educational system. Thus 
the tension between the national system of innovation and regulation can not fully be 
solved in the regional political economy and negotiation processes.  The ability of 
the regional level institutions and organizations to enter into integrative negotiations, 
will to some extent define the degree to which the innovation system can develop 
into a more coherent framework. If the negotiations are distributive, the colleges will 
have to innovate ”around” the others, resulting in turf sharing and adaption of divi-
sion of labor. 
 
Diversity, configurations and negotiations 
RUSH is producing local adaptions to a variable degree, and represents an input or 
selective mechanism through which the evolution of the innovation systems takes 
place over time. The different models coming out the RUSH initiative add on the va-
riations in the regional economies. This relates to the concept of diversity, and this 
section will discuss some further implications and extentions of the mechanisms 
through which regional innovation systems appearently evolve. 
 
Diversity in general is supposed to offer positive economic consequences and is 
tightly linked to the notion of innovation systems (Dosi et al 1988; Metcalfe 1992; 
Cohendet 1991, 1992). Diversity, however, is mainly an ecological concept, pointing 
to the basis for selection and retention mechanisms so important for economic com-
petition. Cohendet and Llerena 1997:223-ff) refer to four main types of diversity: 
 
•= The diversity of factor endowments lead to different competitive advantages 
for firms and nations; 
•= The diversity of products and services available to customers; 
•= The diversity of behaviours between firms, also resulting in specific firm per-
formances and competitive advantages; 
•= The technological diversity, related to the competencies and learning proc-
esses linked to the idea of technological change as a process of evolutionary 
change. 
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Thus, diversity refers essentially to phenomena in the market place, and the ecologi-
cal metaphor of diversity conveys the notion of competitive processes. Further, di-
versity is a matter of degree, not of kind, meaning that it is not a structural concept. 
To exploit the very idea of innovation system, which inherently is linked to the struc-
ture between components and the quality of relations between them, we need another 
concept, also covering other processes than competition and selection. Negotiations, 
as we have seen, take place between parties of different positions, not with reference 
to degrees.  
 
The structural connotation of innovation systems requires therefore the concept of 
configuration, a concept that appreciates that processes between parties are influ-
enced by the very position they hold in the system, or the structural reference of this 
position. Institutional configurations hampers markets as well as define future pros-
pects and opportunities for development, and links the institutional structure of the 
private sector with that of the public. ”…constraints and opportunities of national and 
regional economies are cast in with the associated institutional set-up. In a sense this 
brand of political economy ultimately argues the primacy of the ”political” over the 
”economical”” (Kluth and Andersen 1996). While the innovation system approach is 
generally lacking the appreciation of politics, it seems clear that institutional configu-
rations are important for the structure and performance of innovation systems, mak-
ing it necessary to view the concept of innovation system essentially as a political-
economic concept. Thus, innovation systems are developed in an evolutionary sense, 
but the socio-economic mechanism can be framed as negotiation and learning, in-
cluding exerting power, influence and trust. These processes take place within na-
tional frameworks, e.g. as national rules and regulations associated with the educa-
tional system and governed by the ministry of research and education. A useful con-
cept in this respect has been developed by David Soskice (1991), refering to the Na-
tional Framework of Incentives and Constraints” (NIFCs), which are of vital impor-
tance to how the negotiation processes take place on a regional level. The adaptabil-
ity of regional innovation systems is therefore highly dependent on these NIFCs, but 
the regional or local configuration may produce outcomes, e.g. through effective, in-
tegrative negotiations, that transcend the configuration envisaged from the national 
level at the outset. 
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The quality of configuration, i.e. the quality of relations between the parties in a re-
gional innovation system, cannot not be defined universally. In other words, high qu-
ality innovation systems do not possess the same characteristica. The need to find 
configurations that fit the ”Regional Framework of Incentives and Constraints” is 
hence of vital importance, but this is, given the politcal nature of this process, also 
dependent on the quality of the political system, in this context the nature and abili-
ties of the interest groups and parties to engage in negotiation processes that are es-
sentially integrative, i.e. processes that generate system outcomes that represent key 
improvements of the way the regional innovation system performs. And this has been 
highlighted in the case of RUSH, where the extreme models of Vestfold and Agder 
both represent outcomes of high additionality. Innovation systems are negotiated 
configurations. 
 
The policy implications of this, and which may define the starting point for 
REGINN, can be summarized as the following: At one level, more attention should 
be given to horisontal policy development at the national level. This should aim at 
clarifying the national framework of incentives and constraints, in particular through 
inter-agency integrative bargaining. The need to produce horisontal policies to sup-
port the evolution of national technology and innovation policies, is strongly argued 
by Teubal (….). But it could be useful to decompose this into specifiable elements 
containing strategies for integrative negotiations, overcoming the competitive and 
particular embeddeddness of ministries and agencies. In other words, the policy 
should move on from a ”single-component” adaptive strategy to a national consensus 
on the need to change incentives and constratints on the national level at large to lay 
the foundations for high-performing regional models.   
 
The general aim for policy oriented at the regional level, would be to stimulate the 
conditions for developing optimal contractual relations through integrative negotia-
tions, contractual relations in this context meaning the mutual relations between par-
ties, including trust, learning and a consensual configuration of the system compo-
nents. On the one hand, a policy should contain a ”multi-component” approach, giv-
ing the responsibility for improving configurations and relations to many parties. On 
the other, a policy should contain elements of a framework for integrative negotia-
tions, in which the parties engage in processes that are regionally embedded and pro-
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duce vital additionalities in the configurations at hand. This general implication may 
be translated into guidelines based on the notion that the evolution of systems are 
decision making and negotiation processes. The difficulties of reconfiguring institu-
tional settings are very much like the very reasons why integrative negotiations are 
difficult to initiate: First, the parties have earlier and negative relations. Second, the 
parties both or all think that only zero-sum games (or distributive bargaining) is pos-
sible. And third, the parties have different motives for entering into negotiations.  
 
To conclude this section, initiatives to improve the regional institutions’ role and po-
sition in the respective innovation system should to a greater extent structure the 
process in which the negotiations take place. The regional institutional setting has a 
history, and to improve the innovative capability of regional economies, configura-
tions need to be developed that transcend this history. 
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Enters REGINN 
 
RUSH is essentially a ”single-component” systems policy, aiming at improving the 
role of one particular component in the innovation system, the state colleges. But al-
ready during the early stages of the RUSH programme, it became increasingly evi-
dent that a broader institutional approach was needed. This was on the one hand 
rooted in the increasing focus on innovation systems coming from policy oriented 
research in this area, especially from 1992 and onwords. Thus, the change in the pol-
icy research agenda contributed in a certain shift in focus. On the other hand there 
was a growing concern inside the research council about the appearant lack of coor-
dination of innovation resources on the regional level, especially the poor links be-
tween the state colleges and the regional research foundations. The REGINN initia-
tive cannot be seen as an extension of RUSH, but builds on a more complex evolu-
tion of a programmatic approach. This legacy will be discussed to provide a broader 
insight into process leading to REGINN. The policy context for RUSH discussed ear-
lier in the paper is therfore widened to allow for a more specific contextual analysis. 
 
The legacy of regional R&D policy 
The increasing attention during the –80s on promoting a regional infrastructure for 
R&D and economic development led to, as we have discussed earlier, to a system of 
regional research foundations. At that time the colleges were fragmented as a system, 
and the knowledge infrastructure was difficult to access from the point of view of the 
business community. During the –80s, an attempt to increase the coordination of this 
system was promoted (NOU 1981:30A), called regional competence centres. The 
main idea was to organize a ”one door model” for the business community. The 
competence centre was the organizational answer to deal with a fragmented and 
complex system, and the business community could rely on a simple entry into the 
innovation system. The ministry of local government and labor later admitted that 
this policy was a complete failure, among other things because it was arranged as a 
top-down approach and because it presupposed a regional system where the firms’ 
great variety of needs could be satisfied. 
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This lesson led to a legitimation of initiatives to improve the industry’s more active 
use of national R&D institutions, e.g. through programmes like TEFT. But it also led 
to new initiatives to improve the regional institutions’ relationships with the business 
community. RUSH can be seen in this light. But other initiatives came. After RUSH 
had been established, the ministry of local government and labor started a process 
together with the association of the regional research foundations, FOKUS, to pro-
mote a programme for ”strategic industrial research”. The initiative came from 
FOKUS itself due to consistent problems in gaining a sufficient level of basic fund-
ing. The lack of such funding (in general it was about 10 % of the turnover, the rest 
being contract research in competition with others on the national scene) represented 
a draw-back in competitiveness, since the typical national R&D institutions had sig-
nificantly higher levels. 
 
The strategic industrial research programme (here given the acronym SIRP) in the 
regional research foundations started in 1993, and it is quite noteworthy that the 
RUSH initiative that started late 1994-early 1995 paid little attention to this pro-
gramme. Throughout 1995 to 1997, the period during which both programmes were 
active, no coordination or bridging was attempted. This is all the more peculiar, since 
SIRP had a clear infrastructural focus: The white paper on regional policy 
(St.meld.nr. 33, 1992-93) stated the objectives as: 
 
•= To contribute to the easier access for the business community in all regions to 
the national and regional knowledge infrastructure; 
•= To contribute to increased exploitation of the knowledge sources by the rural-
ly based firms. 
 
The SIRP was further operationalized in two key objectives: 
 
•= To increase the competence at the regional research foundations, especially to 
build top competence and make this accessible for the business community; 
•= To help improve the institutions’ contact with and usefulness for the local in-
dustry. 
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We will not discuss this programme in detail, but refer to some main issues pointed 
out in the mid-term evalution (Eriksson 1996). Not all institutions participated in 
SIRP (a screening process was done), but most of these entered into a cumbersome 
and time consuming process, leading eventually to a set of institutionally based pro-
grammes for industrial research, mainly social science based. The research founda-
tions in both Agder and Telemark participated, Agder with a distinct consulting ap-
proach, Telemark with a rather weak approach with few industrial contacts and a dif-
ficult relationship with the college. In general, Eriksson gives SIRP support as a pro-
gramme aimed at redirecting the focus in the foundations, but is also rather critical of 
the approach many of them chose. Many, however, developed a competence match-
ing the prevailing industrial structure in their region (implying that a greater degree 
of over all specialization should lead to a national status as a R&D institutions in 
their respective fields), although with rather variable results vis-a-vis industry in 
practice. 
 
But like RUSH, SIRP was a single component programme, aiming at improving the 
resources and role of one part of the knowledge infrastructure. SIRP had no inten-
tions to or particular consequences for an improved structural configuration of the 
regional innovation system. It’s main function was to direct resources to the regional 
research foundations to alleviate low levels of basic funding and to improve their in-
dustrial focus. 
 
The lack of over all coordination was the background for another initiative in late 
1994. The research council, in a cross-divisional effort at improved infrastructural 
coordination started a process to develop a more coherent plan for the knowledge 
infrastructure: 
 
 ”NT, KS, BF, IE and MU (all research divisions) require a study on how the 
regional research foundations in interplay with the technical-industrial re-
search institutes, institutes for agriculture and fisheries, and institutes for so-
cial science, can improve their role as instruments for regional economic de-
velopment through strategic programmes” (Internal memo, strategy division, 
12.12.94). 
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The argument was basically that the total mass of resources for regional economic 
development was abundant, but that the main problem was the inherent disperse 
structure, weak links and small institutions. The study, finalized early 1996, referred 
to both RUSH and the SIRP system, made the following statement: 
 
 ”It is important that the state colleges and the regional research foundations 
cooperate closely to define areas of collaboration/constellations so that the 
services to the business community are presented in a coherent and consistent 
way from the regional research and knowledge system. 
 
A rational exploitation of the resources at both institutions in collaboration 
will therefore represent an important challenge. The demands from the minis-
try of research and education on external funding in the state colleges will 
easily contradict this” (NFR 1996:11). 
 
The study concluded that the SIRP system should continue, albeit in a broader pro-
gramme focused at the regional research system (which included both the research 
foundations and the colleges) and their relationship to the wider national system. It 
was explicitly stated that a separate establishment of contract organizations in the 
colleges competeing with the regional research foundations (which RUSH tried to 
accomplish). In sum, this proposal had a reflected systems perspective highly needed 
after an increasing fragmentation of the innovation system through non-coordinated 
programmes. 
 
The proposal was communicated to the ministry of local government and labor in 
March 1996 by the research council’s general manager, stating explicitly the need to 
integrate RUSH into the proposed programme.  
 
The REGINN programme 
 
Main intentions 
The proposed programme was not implemented directly. Instead the ministry decided 
to fund a new programme for regional innovation called REGINN. The initiative was 
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based upon the lessons from the SIRP system as well as the growing attention to the 
need for a more coherent policy for innovation systems. The programme memoran-
dum, adopted in the board of the programme for technology transfer (PTT) 25.6.97, 
contained the statement that ”the programme consentrates on how institutions in the 
regional innovation system - in particular the regional R&D institutions – can pro-
vide resources for the business community more effecticvely in the further develop-
ment of innovative industrial milieus”. The memo was firmly based in recent policy 
research: 
 
 ”International research shows that well-functioning innovation systems – both 
global, national and regional – play an important role for the competitiveness 
of industry, for the firms’ innovative capabilities, and to maintain employ-
ment (reference is here made to Lundwall (1992) and Koschatzky and Ku-
licke (1994)). The firms’ innovation activities demand coordination and dia-
logue both internal in the firms and external in relation to many other partners 
and interest groups. This can be other firms – both competitors, suppliers and 
customers, financial institutions, government and R&D institutions. Innova-
tion processes take place in many ways through internal learning, networks 
between firms and between firms and the surrounding support system” (Pro-
gramme memorandum 1991997:2). 
 
Reference was also made to the need for a cross-sectoral focus to reduce the barriers 
to innovation. In particular ”there is a need for increased coordination between re-
gional policy, industrial policy, and research policy with a clear focus on the diverse 
regional conditions – strengths and weaknesses”. We note that no reference is made 
to educational policy: The state colleges are no integrated part of this approach on a 
policy level. 
 
Objectives,  target groups and instruments 
The over all objective was ”… to contribute to stimulate and implement innovation 
activities in the firms which participate in the programme. This is further split in two 
key objectives in line with the goal structure implemented in the programme for 
technology transfer in the research council: 
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Business development:  REGINN shall strenghten the building of relationships 
and the practical cooperation between regional R&D 
institutions and clusters of industry in the region. 
Infrastructure: REGINN shall contribute to the establishment of re-
gional arenas, meeting points and prosesses where the 
regional R&D institutions to a greater extent cooperate 
in networks with others in the regional and national 
innovation system. 
 
The target groups were defined primarily as firms and the regional R&D institutions. 
The selection of firms could be based on a sectoral principle or on one or more clus-
ters.  
 
REGINN was to be process oriented and rested on two instruments; the two stages of 
identification and implementation. The first stage was essentially analysis, paving the 
way for implementing selected projects in the next stage. However, REGINN repre-
sented an attempt to build processes and structures ”bottom up”, inviting the regions 
to establish committees for collaboration in promoting the identification of good pro-
jects. The programme memorandum even emphasized the need to select ”an enthusi-
astic and integrative committee chairman” and that the project manager should ”be 
responsible for the regional innovation study and the subsequent application for pro-
ject funding. The project manager  ….. shall have a formal basis in one of the R&D 
institutions in the region”. 
 
Thus, the organizing principle was prescribed, and the success in the prequalifying 
stage of the programme was to be heavily dependent on the degree to which the re-
gions stuck to this model. 
 
The stage of implementation consisted of implementing the projects funded out of 
the first stage. The main idea was to link the projects to the identified innovation ne-
eds in the respective sector or cluster. 
 
REGINN has explicitly aimed at contributing to improved coordination between all 
the existing institutions, instruments and programmes in this general policy area. 
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This is consistent with the later development in which increasing needs for coordina-
tion and coherence are not met by major reforms but adding on new programmes 
with a coordinating side-objective. This is a major point to which we will return.  
 
The REGINN programme was however implemented in a new way. Due to scarce 
resources and the import of a ”call for proposal” model similar to that of the RIITS 
programme in EU, all counties were invited to a prequalification stage in which a 
plan for the identification stage was to be the outcome. The county administration 
was thus selected as the institutions to take on a coordinating role, linking up to the 
relevant parties in the region, also in collaboration with other, neighbouring counties. 
As the funding mainly came from the ministry of local government and labor, the 
approach in the regions was expected to have a clear ”rural profile”, implying that 
due consideration would be given to satisfying the criteria of eligibility in the rural 
and regional policy (essentially avoiding central areas.). 
 
At this point it is necessary to explain the informal translation of REGINNs philoso-
phy from the programme memorandum to implementation. The institutional ap-
proach in the early programmes of the –90s had the systemic focus required, albeit 
often single component based like RUSH. Still, they continued a tradition of ”institu-
tion building”. The implicit philosophy was that innovations or better, innovation 
systems, could be planned. Regional innovation systems invites the concept of tradi-
tional planning, were through adjustments in linkages and structure one may arrive at 
better performance. In this way institution building is like fine tuning, or social engi-
neering, of the complex structures and interactions. The limited resources devoted to 
REGINN leads to trying a different approach, where the idea of planning is reduced. 
The regions are to start in ”practice” in which people, organizations and institutions 
interact and gives both an innovative and institutional result. The system is no longer 
completely interdependent, but ”loosely coupled”, and REGINN’s task is to initiate 
processes that select environments and produce results based on the interests and ini-
tiatives of regions and people concerned. Coordination is not to take place from 
above, but through local action. Coordination becomes ecological more than admin-
istrative. 
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The intention was to give REGINN projects to only a restricted number of counties, 
ca 10 out of 19 at the outset. It was communicated in the prequalifiying round that 
applicants should take care to select practical projects, i.e. to concentrate on selecting 
clusters of firms or a sectoral approach and use the idenfying stage to studying the 
innovation challenges in this cluster, and then select innovation projects for the im-
plementation stage.  Hence, those counties which had a minimum level of coopera-
tive relations with industry, R&D institutions etc, would have an advantage. The ex-
pected outcome would be that of already strong counties to be selected. 
 
The pattern of selected counties and projects 
And this is in general confirmed. The projects to be implemented in the fall of 1998 
will be managed by the 7 counties so far succesful. We note first of all that two coun-
ties or groups of counties are selected: Rogaland, the county of petroleum and agri-
cultural clusters, and Troms and Finnmark in collaboration, an area in northern Nor-
way which for years has been the target for a bundle of initiatives (see Isaksen on the 
NT programme). The rest of initiated REGINN projects include three of our RUSH 
counties (including the twin county of Agder), excluding the county of Østfold which 
did not succeed. 
 
The projects follows essentially the philosophy of REGINN, giving more wieght and 
attention to the demand side: All projects are meant to stimulate innovation in se-
lected sectors or groups/clusters of firms in the region, and support have been given 
to projects where the industry is heavily involved: ”The electronic coast” in Vestfold 
will stimuate innovation and cooperation in the electronics industry, Telemark em-
barks on two projects, one on product development in the plastics industry and one 
on environmental issues in the same industry, The Agder counties will stimulate and 
implement innovation processes in the industry building smaller plastic based boats.  
 
We will not og to far into the details of the REGINN programme. Suffice it to say 
that the RUSH programme paved the way for participation in REGINN. Both Agder, 
Telemark and Vestfold were able to build on the results and lessons generated in 
RUSH to come up with networks and ideas for REGINN. The essentially institu-
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tional results coming out of RUSH fitted nicely as preconditions for participation in 
RUSH. 
 
This pattern of self selection of counties is of some concern since both RUSH and 
REGINN had a selective approach; RUSH by managerial decision and REGINN by 
”survival of the fittest”. In other words, RUSH became the means through which 
most of the participants managed to strenghten their competitive advantage vis-a-vis 
others to join REGINN. This is all the more interesting since RUSH was an experi-
ment, aimed at generating lessons that could be transferred to other colleges. Instead 
it generates advantages for participating in the next programme that conceives insti-
tutional change as something that should precede the activities or be developed 
through the mechanism of learning from the lessons of practical projects. While 
REGINN could have been a programme for those disadvantaged in earlier pro-
grammes, the result was the opposite. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
It is of course to early to assess the impacts of REGINN, and our intention here has 
not been so. Instead, the evolution and conception of REGINN som some extent 
represents an indicator of the relative success of RUSH: Those counties which par-
ticipated in RUSH, improved their competitive advantage in the competition for 
REGINN participation. 
 
The results from RUSH indicates the need to design programmes with a high level of 
contextual or regional sensitivity. The diverse models coming out of RUSH demon-
strate the importance of different traditions, cultures and configurations that enter 
into the processes of systems design. They also point to the key importance of the 
diversity of ”knowledge cultures” that are embedded in the regions and their con-
stituencies: Knowledge cultures represent a framework for how people and organiza-
tions ask questions and relate to each other, as well as define trajectories of develop-
ment in business and political life.16 
 
RUSH can, as mentioned, be seen as successful in the sense that it had institutional 
impacts. But the lessons from RUSH contains a key message: Deficiencies in the 
knowledge infrastructure cannot be solved only by state level programmes that in-
clude some coordination mandate, when the thrust of the state educational works in a 
rather contradictory way. Although there seems to some flexibility in the way rules 
and regulations from the ministry of research and education are met by local players, 
the strict sectoral approach taken by this ministry represents important institutional 
barriers. The high degree of state centralization in these matters probably stems from 
the dominance of the welfare state, which across may sectors aim at producing equal-
ity in public services vis-a-vis the public. Municipalities and local/regional govern-
ments have their roles defined as distributive institutions in the welfare state, rather 
than developing institutions for the regional level. 
 
                                                
16 The concept of knowledge cultures was discussed at a seminar in Manchester 17-18 
September on ”Knowledge as a development factor”. The seminar was arranged by EU’s 
DG XVI as a component in the process of ”European Spatial Development Perspective”, 
and the concept was raised by Richard Knight. 
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The increasing fragmentation that result from the added programme initiatives lead 
to increased coordination needs that the programmes in turn need to address. On the 
one hand this raises the issue of proper levels of coordination: Should coordination 
efforts be achieved at the national level where such programmes are initiated and 
planned, or ot the local level where impacts are supposed to take place? On the other 
hand, it raises the issue of whether programme and institutional coordination is the 
appropriate approach to the problem, in so far as institutional reforms may be more 
effective. Thus, the issue at stake is whether policies and instruments are designed 
instead of institutional reforms, and whether they may be more effective if they are 
integrated in their very modus operandi, rather than issued as separate programmes 
with the associated coordination needs. The implication is that coordination will be 
better if these policies are integrated at the level of execution, i.e. on some regional 
level. 
 
We have focussed on the importance of negotiation and development of contractual 
relations as the key process to develop and change configurations of regional innova-
tion systems. The approach taken by REGINN seems fruitful in this respect, where 
coordination and/or integration may be reached through the local processes. Hence, 
development coalitions seem to be important structures which can transcend interests 
and positions into collective action. This ”political economy” version of innovation 
systems could then be seen as an entry to ”learning regions”, in which key players in 
the regions and beyond are embedded in territories and institutional settings that rep-
resent the foundations for interactive learning (see Asheim 1998, for a discussion). 
The main point here is that the knowledge society may require new solutions for mo-
bilization of knowledge and for dissemination of knowledge into value added activi-
ties. This goes appearently especially for the centralized welfare states like Norway, 
where standardized solutions deemed necessary from a welfare policy point of view, 
also represent the cause of a high degree of centralization and a deterioration of what 
we would call capability for collective, developmental action at the regional level. 
 
This is also in line with the idea that integration is the best form of coordina-
tion: Regional agglomerations are of growing importance as a ”mode of economic 
coordination in post-Fordist learning economies” (Asheim and Isaksen 1997; 
Cooke 1994, cited in Asheim 1998). But for regional players and institutions to 
engage in interactive learning and integrative negotiation, they need to possess 
70 STEP  Working Paper  A-02/1999 
 
 
a minimum degree of independence from central or state authorities. Learning 
is a localised process, combining economic and non-economic elements. And this 
leads to a key conclusion in this paper: Regional innovation systems are systems 
of political economy, and the localised innovation processes cannot be under-
stood without the specific context of the nation state.  
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STEP-gruppen ble etablert i 1991 for å forsyne 
beslutningstakere med forskning knyttet til alle 
sider ved innovasjon og teknologisk endring, med 
særlig vekt på forholdet mellom innovasjon, 
økonomisk vekst og de samfunnsmessige 
omgivelser. Basis for gruppens arbeid er 
erkjennelsen av at utviklingen innen vitenskap og 
teknologi er fundamental for økonomisk vekst. Det 
gjenstår likevel mange uløste problemer omkring 
hvordan prosessen med vitenskapelig og 
teknologisk endring forløper, og hvordan denne 
prosessen får samfunnsmessige og økonomiske 
konsekvenser. Forståelse av denne prosessen er av 
stor betydning for utformingen og iverksettelsen av 
forsknings-, teknologi- og innovasjonspolitikken.  
Forskningen i STEP-gruppen er derfor sentrert 
omkring historiske, økonomiske, sosiologiske og 
organisatoriske spørsmål som er relevante for de 
brede feltene innovasjonspolitikk og økonomisk 
vekst.  
 
 
The STEP-group was established in 1991 to support 
policy-makers with research on all aspects of 
innovation and technological change, with particular 
emphasis on the relationships between innovation, 
economic growth and the social context. The basis 
of the group’s work is the recognition that science, 
technology and innovation are fundamental to 
economic growth; yet there remain many unresolved 
problems about how the processes of scientific and 
technological change actually occur, and about how 
they have social and economic impacts. Resolving 
such problems is central to the formation and 
implementation of science, technology and 
innovation policy. The research of the STEP group 
centres on historical, economic, social and 
organisational issues relevant for broad fields of 
innovation policy and economic growth. 
 
